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Abstract
Professor Obiora Chinedu Okafor of Osgoode Hall School of Law, Toronto, Canada, has writ-
ten a well-researched and valuable book about Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations
(”NGOs”) in Nigeria. ... “ Similarly, in many countries, NGOs, in their capacity as civic society,
have been given official roles in some key governance institutions such as in Nigerian National
Human Rights Commissions, media watchdogs, Governmental Commissions, and so forth. In
chapter five of the book, Professor Okafor candidly describes the funding patterns of human rights
NGOs in Nigeria. As Professor Okafor tells the story, the trail of the ”popular legitimization cri-
sis” of local human rights NGOs clearly begins with the vexing issue of foreign funding. This
confirms Professor Mutua’s earlier admonitions on the role of foreign funding in human rights
activism in the African continent: What Professor Okafor brilliantly demonstrates from his empir-
ical work is the dire outcomes of this legitimization crisis–consequences on the efficacy of these
human rights NGOs that should make every human rights activist pause. Because of the form of
external funding, and due to the absence of competing opportunities with more substantial rewards
in other sectors, including the governmental sector, starting and attracting funding for NGOs in
most African states is an extremely lucrative form of gainful employment.
THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN AFRICA
Okechukwu Oko *
INTRODUCTION
Africa is a continent in perpetual turmoil.1 A cursory review
of the continent of Africa reveals a troubling catalogue of social
maladies traceable to state failure.2 Some African countries have
experienced civil war, military dictatorships, massive human
rights violations, and genocide.' Others are spiraling toward so-
cial disorder, roiled incessantly by corruption, weak and ineffec-
tive institutions, ethnic hostilities, and reciprocal tribal hatreds.4
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1. For an interesting collection of essays examining the causes and effects of con-
flicts in various African countries, see CIVIL WARS IN ARICA: ROOTS AND RESOLUTION
(Tasier M. Ali & Robert 0. Mathews eds., 1999).
2. For an account of troubled, collapsed and collapsing states in Africa, see gener-
ally COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHOR-
ITy (I. William Zartman ed., 1995) [hereinafter COLLAPSED STATES]. Zartman defines a
collapsed state as:
[A] deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup, or riot. It refers to a
situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power) law and political
order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new.
On the other hand, it is not necessarily anarchy. Nor is it simply a byproduct of
the rise of ethnic nationalism: it is the collapse of old orders, notably the state,
that brings about the retreat of ethnic nationalism as the residual viable iden-
tity.
I. William Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse to COLLAPSED STATES,
supra note 2, at 1. For a collection of essays exploring the causes and consequences of
state failure, see WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Robert I. Rotberg ed.,
2005).
3. See generally CONFLICr IN AFIcA (Oliver Furley ed., 1995) (examining the causes
of conflicts in Africa); see also Crawford Young, Deciphering Disorder in Africa, Is Identity the
Key?, 54 WORLD POL. 532 (2002) (examining the crises in African countries including
Algeria and Rwanda). For a discussion of state failures in Africa and the social maladies
that contribute to state collapse, see Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 44-76. The prevalence and frequency of conflicts in Africa led
Robert Kaplan to predict that state collapse and ensuing anarchy may be inevitable in
Africa. Id.
4. See Richard Jackson, Managing Africa's Violent Conflicts, 25 PEACE & CHANGE 208,
212 (2000) (stating that most conflicts in Africa have been independence or secession-
ist conflicts, and have involved intangible elements such as ethnicity, identity and na-
tionalism).
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Even with the reemergence of constitutional democracy, human
rights violations are trending upwards in Africa.5 Elected Afri-
can leaders typically use extralegal and often brutal means to
quell internal dissensions from disaffected citizens. Human
rights violations, corruption, and inequitable distribution of the
nation's resources undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of
the central government and often lead to social disequilibrium
and, ultimately, state failures.6 State failures provide volatile, an-
archic environments in which predatory government officials,
opportunistic warlords, and ambitious ethnic chieftains pursue
their goals through violent means.7 The failures of democracy
in Africa and the resulting human rights violations, mass atroci-
ties and genocide continue to bring into sharper focus the need
to promote accountability. Africans, victims and survivors of
human rights abuses, and societies sundered and wounded by
brutal dictators, not only seek respect for their rights but also
accountability from their leaders.'
5. Political elites who showed remarkable courage in the fight against dictatorship
often turn out to be poor democrats. Unable to meaningfully address the concerns of
disaffected citizens, these leaders with intractable despotic tendencies govern by intimi-
dation and repression. Human Rights Watch, an international human rights organiza-
tion, and the United States State Department continue to report human rights abuses
in various African countries. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/
[hereinafter 2006 COUNTRY REPORT].
6. See generally WHEN STATES FAIL, supra note 2 (examining the phenomenon and
causes of state failure); JOHN-PETER PHAM, LIBERIA: PORTRAIT OF A FAILED STATE (2004)
(discussing the problems of state failure in Liberia).
7. Violence in Africa stems from various sources. In some cases, violence seems to
be the only available option for brutalized and marginalized citizens to draw attention
to their plight. See Charles Gore & David Pratten, The Politics of Plunder: The Rhetoric of
Order and Disorder in Southern Nigeria, 102 AiR. AFFAIRS, 211, 212 (2003) (stating that
violent local responses by youth groups mobilized around issues of resource control
and community security are a widespread response to the "politics of plunder" and an
endemic feature of the Nigerian social landscape). The authors further state that
"ongoing struggles for the codification of new rights and privileges ... combined with
worsening inequalities and corruption lead to public and private violence that is in-
creasingly uncontrolled." Id. at 213. In some cases, some ethnic chieftains view violence
as a vital means to attain power. See, e.g., Dennis M. Tull & Andreas Mehler, The Hidden
Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa, 104 AFR. AFFAIRS, 375, 376
(2005) (stating that "would-be leaders have some reason to conceptualize the organiza-
tion of violence as a viable path to occupying at least parcels of state power").
8. For an examination of various accountability mechanisms, see generally STEVEN
R. RATNER &JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILI'IY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAw: BEYOND THE NUREMBURG LEGACY (1997); 1 TRANSITIONALJUSTICE: How
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
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Before the advent of international criminal prosecutions,
the international community expressed vague disquiet about
atrocities and massive human rights violations in the continent
of Africa.9 Constrained by concerns for national sovereignty and
politics, the world community never seriously attempted to
check the excesses of tyrannical and despotic leaders that ruled
Africa.' ° An intensely distracted world community rightfully
placed more importance on issues like the Cold War and nu-
clear proliferation, leaving hapless African citizens to bear their
fate without international assistance."1 Hubristic African leaders
hid behind the niceties of national sovereignty and flagrantly
abused their citizens without fear of reprisals from the interna-
tional community.' 2 Vulnerable, disaffected and oppressed citi-
zens dealt with impunity the best way they knew: through vio-
lence in the form of coups, counter-coups,'1 assassinations of
9. See Douglas Farah, African Pillagers, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2006, at B01 (stating
that tragic style leadership prospered in Africa because of their ruthlessness, interna-
tional indifference, their control of vital resources, or a combination of these factors).
10. HELENA COBBAN, AMNESTY AFTER ATROcrrY? HEALING NATIONS AFTER GENOCIDE
AND WAR CRIMES 5-6 (2007) [hereinafter AMNESTY AFTER ATROCITY?]
Too often throughout the centuries past, these abusive leaders did indeed en-
joy a seeming impunity from any meaningful reckoning: This impunity was
upheld, on the one hand, by a version of realpotitik that often cowed critics
from inside and outside the countries in question, discouraging them from
confronting the malefactors openly about their misdeeds, and on the other
hand-at the international level-by adherence to a long-held interpretation
of the concept of sovereignty that left every national-level ruler quite free to
treat his own 'subjects' exactly as he pleased.
Id.
11. The international community typically responded after the fact to provide hu-
manitarian assistance and in some cases to protect minority groups from abusive des-
pots. For a collection of essays discussing the politics, theories and practice of interven-
tion, see generally HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Jen-
nifer M. Welsh ed., 2004).
12. International law norms recognized the concept of national sovereignty, which
generally barred states from interfering in the internal affairs of other states. Article III
of the African Union Charter requires Member States to "solemnly affirm and declare
their adherence to the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence." Organization of
African Unity Charter art. III, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (entered into force Sept.
13, 1963).
13. For an interesting study of coups in Africa, see SAMUEL DECALO, CouPs AND
ARMY RULE IN AFRICA: STUDIES IN MILITARY STYLE (1976); PatrickJ. McGowan, African
Military Coups de'etat 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution, 41J. MOD. AFR. STUD.
339 (2003).
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leaders, ethnic strife, genocide and civil war. 4 Lately, however,
African countries, either on their own, or prodded by the West,
have shown an increased capacity and willingness to promote ac-
countability through the legal process."5
There exists in Africa a general agreement about the need
for accountability, but a certain divergence exists as to how this
could be pursued. Some countries use criminal prosecutions to
address the aftermath of mass violence.16 Others prefer non-in-
carcerative mechanisms, like truth commissions' v and amnesty,' 8
14. For a general discussion of civil conflicts in Africa, see Paul Collier & Anke
Hoeffler, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 46J. CONFLICT RES. 13 (2002).
15. Craig Timberg, Ex-African Leaders Face Courts Not Guns, Prr. POsT-GAzETrE,
May 7, 2006, at A4 (despite the political flavor of many of the cases, however, analysts,
legal experts and human rights activists say that the court's actions mark a new era, in
which African disputes increasingly are being resolved by judges rather than soldiers).
For an examination of various accountability mechanisms in different countries, see
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 8.
16. African countries that have used domestic courts to address the ills of the past
include Ethiopia, Rwanda and Nigeria. See generally David Stoelting, Enforcement of Inter-
national Criminal Law, 34 INT'L L. 669 (2000) (listing Rwanda and Ethiopia as countries
that have used domestic courts to try operatives of past regimes). For a general discus-
sion of prosecutions before domestic courts, see Ruth Wedgwood, National Courts and
the Prosecution of War Crimes, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 389
(2000). Some nations try ex-leaders for acts that violate the criminal or penal code. In
Nigeria, for example, some operatives of the former militaryjunta are currently on trial
for violation of the criminal and penal codes. See generally Okechukwu Oko, Confronting
Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes: Towards a More Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 89, 96-97 (2003). Other countries like Rwanda try them pursuant to
new legislation specifically dealing with certain enumerated acts, especially genocide
and crimes against humanity. Rwandan courts have tried several cases emanating from
the genocide. See Organic Law of Aug. 30, 1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for
Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed
Since Oct. 1, 1990, No. 08/09, available at http://www.rwandemb.org/prosecution/law.
htm. Ethiopia, after the fall of dictator Mengistu, tried officials of the Mengistu regime
on charges of war crimes and genocide. Former head of state and despot Mengistu was
tried in absentia following unsuccessful attempts to secure his extradition from South
Africa. See generally Firew Kebede Tiba, The Mengistu Genocide Trial in Ethiopia, 5J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 513 (2007). The former president of Equatorial Guinea, Macias, was tried
for a variety of crimes, including genocide. He was convicted and executed. See LEO
KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 16 (1985). Fredrick Chiluba, the former Presi-
dent of Zambia, is battling corruption charges before a domestic court. See Craig
Timberg, In Cases of Africa's Ex-leaders, Justice Shifts From Soldiers to Courts, WASH. POST,
May 2, 2006, at A16.
17. See generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE
TERROR AND ATROCITY (2001) (presenting detailed analysis of truth commissions in dif-
ferent post-conflict societies). Some countries, like South Africa, use truth commissions
as an alternative to criminal prosecutions. See RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY:
REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INvESTIGATOR 59-73 (2000). For an excellent collection
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as alternatives to criminal prosecutions. Others use truth com-
missions in combination with criminal trials to address the after-
math of impunity.' 9 Lately, traditional methods of conflict reso-
lution feature prominently in the anti-impunity arsenal of some
African countries.2z It appears, however, that the dominant
mechanism adopted by the international community to address
impunity is criminal prosecution.2 ' Currently, investigations and
prosecutions of serious crimes are taking place in post-conflict
African societies before the ad hoc international tribunals in
Rwanda,22 the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 23 and lately, the
International Criminal Court ("ICC") at the Hague.24
of essays examining the values and shortcomings of truth commissions, see TRUTH V.
JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thomp-
son eds., 2000).
18. See generally AMNESTY AFTER ATROCITY?, supra note 10 (discussing the use of
amnesty by post-conflict societies to achieve the goals of reconciliation and consolida-
tion of rule of law).
19. Other countries, like Sierra Leone, use truth commissions in combination with
criminal trials to address the aftermath of impunity. See William A. Schabas, A Synergistic
Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, 15 CRiM. L. F. 3 (2004); Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal
Responsibility and National Reconciliation: The UN Truth Commission in East Timor, 95 Am.J.
INT'L L. 952, 953 (2001) (noting that the East Timor Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion was "designed to complement ... criminal proceedings").
20. For an examination of traditional justice mechanisms in different parts of Af-
rica, see TRADITIONAL CURES FOR MODERN CONFLICTS: AFRICAN CONFLICT "MEDICINE" (I.
William Zartman ed., 2000) [hereinafter TRADITIONAL CURES].
21. JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, WAR CRIMES AND REAL POLITIK 8 (2004) (noting
that "international criminal tribunals ... have become the international community's
primary response to humanitarian crises").
22. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), S.C. Res.
955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
23. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, which commenced operations in 2002 was
established by an agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra
Leone. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000,). The jurisdiction of
the court is limited to events that occurred after November 1996. For an interesting
analysis of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, see John Cerone, The Special Court for
Sierra Leone: Establishing a New Approach to International Criminal Justice, 8 ILSAJ. INT'L &
COMp. L. 378 (2002); Vincent 0. Nmehielle & Charles ChernorJalloh, The Legacy of The
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD Aer. 107 (2006);J. Peter Pham, A
Viable Model for International Criminal Justice: The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 19 N.Y.
INT'L L. REv. 37 (2006).
24. The International Criminal Court ("ICC") was established on July 1, 2002 and
is located at the Hague, Netherlands. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
The statute which established the ICC and other documents concerning the operation
and activities of the court can be found at its web site at http://www.icc-cpi-int. African
countries, most of which supported the creation of an international criminal court,
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This Article evaluates the problems and challenges of inter-
national criminal prosecutions in Africa. It examines whether
international criminal prosecutions can be used as a vehicle to
contribute to "national reconciliation and to the restoration and
maintenance of peace." 25 I concede that punishing perpetrators
of evil is definitively a viable mechanism for combating impu-
nity. 26 In appropriate cases, the criminal process can be
have shown remarkable interest in using the court to redress impunity. Thomas
Lubanga, a Congolese warlord, is the first African to be arraigned before the ICC for
charges of war crimes consisting of enlisting and conscripting under-aged children. See
Marlise Simons, Congo Warlord's Case Is First for International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2006, at A9. The President of Central African Republic, Francois Bozize, asked
the court to investigate the atrocities of his predecessor, Ange-F6lix Patasse. See
Timberg, supra note 16. Similarly, the Presidents of Ivory Coast, Congo and Uganda
have requested the court to investigate the activities of armed groups operating in their
respective countries. Id. Charles Taylor, former warlord and President of Liberia, is
currently on trial before the ICC. Marlise Simon, Trial of Liberia's Ex-Leader Languishes
Amid Delays, Bureaucracy and Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007. He is charged with multi-
ple crimes, including dragooning of children into combat, the hacking off of limbs and
the killing of thousands of civilians in the 1990s. See Marlise Simons, Europe: The Hague,
April Trial for Charles Taylor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A6. The International Crimi-
nal Court prosecutor is currently investigating top Sudanese government officials ac-
cused of complicity in the genocide in Darfur, Sudan. See Nora Broustany & Stephanie
McCrummen, Sudan OfficialAccused of War Crimes, WASH. PosT, Feb. 28, 2007 (reporting
that the ICC prosecutor has named a member of the Sudanese President's inner circle
as a suspect in the atrocities in Darfur).
25. S.C Res. 955, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
The objectives of the ICTR are clearly stated in the preamble of the Security Council
resolution that established it. The Security Council:
Expressing once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide
and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international hu-
manitarian law have been committed in Rwanda,
Determining that this situation continues to constitute a threat to international
peace and security,
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring
to justice the persons responsible for them,
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the process of
national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace,
Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecu-
tion of persons responsible for genocide and the above-mentioned violations
of international humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such viola-
tions are halted and effectively redressed ....
Id.
26. Several definitions of impunity abound in academic literature. I, however,
adopt the definition suggested by Louis Joinet in his 1996 report to the U.N. Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention and Protection of Minorities. He states that "'[i]mpunity'
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deployed to engineer compliance with the law and to deter
would-be perpetrators of evil. 21 I argue, however, that the objec-
tives of using criminal prosecution to reestablish social equilib-
rium and promote reconciliation, though laudable and rhetori-
cally inspiring, are simply unattainable.2 ' The hope that interna-
means the impossibility, dejure or defacto, of bringing the perpetrators of human rights
violations to account-whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceed-
ings-since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused,
arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making
reparations to their victims." U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators
of Violations of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political Rights), annex II, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 1997) (prepared by Louis Joinet). For an interest-
ing analysis of empirical conceptualization of the concept of impunity, see Jorge E.
Vinuales, Impunity: Elements For an Empirical Concept, 25 L. & INEQ. 115 (2007).
27. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AF-
TER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 122 (1998) (stating that trials may convert the im-
pulse for revenge into state-managed truth seeking and punishment); Neil J. Kritz, Pro-
gress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE,
supra note 27, at 55, 58 (arguing that "[t]rials communicate that the culture of impu-
nity that permitted heinous abuses" to be perpetrated in the first place "is being re-
placed by a culture of accountability," providing some degree of security to victims
while at the same time admonishing and deterring potential future abusers); Michael P.
Sharf & Nigel Rodley, International Principles on Accountability, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE,
89, 90 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002) (arguing that prosecutions deter future perpetra-
tors, curtail resort to self-help and foster respect for the rule of law); Chandra Lekha
Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 19 Am. U. INr'L L. REv
301, 382 (2003) (stating that in "enshrining the rule of law and rights in the new soci-
ety, prosecution may aid social peace by preventing a potential cycle of violence perpe-
trated by those seeking vengeance for prior wrongs"); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling
Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J.
2537, 2542 (arguing that criminal punishment "is the most effective insurance against
future repression").
28. Criminal prosecution has become such an overwhelming objective that the
tribunals appear to have abandoned the broader and more grandiose ambition of "con-
tributing to national reconciliation" and "the restoration and maintenance of peace." A
2001 study by the International Crisis Group found that "[t]he tribunal's contribution
to national reconciliation was non-existent as long as it was still perceived as delivering
victor's justice." See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA: DELAYED JUSTICE 19 (ICG Africa Report No. 30, June 7, 2001), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1649&1=1. Adama Dieng, then
United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and Registrar of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, expressed the prevailing sentiments regarding the abandonment
of its other objectives by the ICTR. He stated that:
Providing external assistance to national justice systems, or undertaking any
other activity other than the pursuit of justice through due criminal process
has been generally deemed ultra vires in respect of the mandate of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, notwithstanding its Preamble, which
might indicate such needs.
Adama Dieng, International CriminalJustice: From Paper to Practice-A Contribution from the
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tional criminal prosecutions will reconcile mutually distrustful
ethnic groups with a long history of reciprocal hatred is quaint,
perhaps even naive.2 9 International criminal prosecutions
launched in Africa amidst much publicity and high expectations
are on the verge of oblivion, perhaps irrelevance. 30 After more
than ten years of international criminal prosecutions in Africa, it
is becoming increasingly obvious that criminal prosecution is a
weak reed on which to hoist the strategy of reestablishing social
equilibrium and reconciling intergroup hostilities in post-con-
flict African societies. A confluence of systemic and environmen-
tal factors have undermined the hoped-for influence of interna-
tional criminal prosecutions in Africa.
First, efforts to use criminal prosecution to modify behavior
and contribute to social equilibrium rest on a failure to appreci-
ate that causes of conflict in Africa cannot be resolved through
the criminal process.3 1 The overarching goal of criminal prose-
cution is to apportion blame and punish the guilty.12 Criminal
prosecutions are not designed to and can neither address nor
alleviate the underlying social problems that lead to and perpet-
uate violence. 3 Violence may be more pronounced in some
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the Establishment of the International Criminal
Court, 25 FOROHAM INT'L L.J. 688, 698 (2002).
29. The idea of using criminal prosecution to reestablish social equilibrium after
mass violence has been severely and rightly criticized by several scholars. See infra note
305 and accompanying text.
30. Kingsley Moghalu, former spokesperson for the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda, provided a scathing but accurate indictment of international criminal
tribunals. He stated, "[m] ore than a decade of international war crimes later, the jury is
in: these tribunals are out of touch with the societies for which they were ostensibly
created, and their achievements and impact have been stunted by this fundamental
disconnect." Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Saddam Hussein's Trial Meets the "Fairness" Test,
20 ETHICS & INr'L AFF. 517, 521 (2006).
31. O.G. PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRlsis: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 355 (1995) (dis-
cussing the genocide in Rwanda, the author states that "the immensity of the crime
cannot be dealt with through moderate versions of European criminal law made for
radically different societies."); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Crimi-
nalJustice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 Am.J. INrr'L L. 7, 31 (2001) (noting that achieving
prevention against an entrenched culture of impunity and fostering inhibitions against
widespread rape, pillage, and murder in a context of habitual violence cannot be real-
ized through the efforts of a few ad hoc tribunals and national trials here and there).
32. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 25-30 (4th ed. 2003).
33. Professor Mark Drumbl, who spent some time in Rwanda, states that "trials
alone will not reconstruct shattered societies. Trials will not thwart the hatreds that give
rise to sectarianism. Trials do not create socioeconomic stability." Mark Drumbl, Nurem-
berg's Legacy, 60 Years Later (Nat'l. Pub. Radio broadcast Sept. 28, 2006).
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parts of Africa, but its causes remain the same in virtually every
African country: ethnic distrust, corruption, marginalization of
ethnic groups and inequitable allocation of a nation's re-
sources.3" The frequency, resilience and indeed the incentive to
resort to violence will shrink by addressing the underlying causes
of violence. 5 These problems cannot be addressed by or
through the prosecution of selected perpetrators of evil. 36 The
culture that sustains social disequilibrium must be counteracted
if accountability is to take roots in Africa.37 Addressing impunity
in Africa will "require more than legal deterrence; it will require
painstaking social and economic development. 38
Second, criminal prosecution is a poor vehicle for restoring
social equilibrium in increasingly fragmented societies balanced
34. See KY. Amoako, U.N. Under-Secretary of Econ. Comm'n for Africa, The Eco-
nomic Causes and Consequences of Civil Wars and Unrest in Africa, Address to the
70th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity,
Algeria (July 8, 1999), available at http://www.africaeconomicanalysis.org/articles/
gen/Africawarhtm.html. KY. Amoako offers four hypotheses for why civil wars occur in
Africa: (1) innate ethnic and religious hatred, where hatred is exposed by ambitious
leaders; (2) national grievance, where the performance of a government is held to be
against the national interest; (3) distributional grievance, where government perform-
ance is held as having been particularly discriminatory against a given group or groups
in society; and (4) employment, where rebellion is an employment choice motivated by
the opportunity cost of employment and the prospective gains from capturing the state
and its resource base. Id.
35. In reviewing the operations of the International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda,
Professors Howland and Calathes state:
[I]f the ideal is to facilitate positive social change in Rwanda that brings about
reconciliation and the respect for human rights, a system based on ill-thought-
out symbolic justice or attainable mass retribution must be scrapped and re-
placed with a more thought-out and creative strategy regarding the structure
and operation of the ICTR.
Todd Howland & William Calathes, The U.N. 's International Criminal Tribunal, Is it Justice
or Jingoism for Rwanda? A Call for Transformation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 135, 165 (1998).
36. Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals, 11
TEMP. IN r'L & COMp. L.J. 167, 168 (1997) (arguing that criminal prosecutions will only
have relevance if they are part of a broader strategy to deal with the foundational
problems).
37. Rosanna Lipscomb, Note, Restructuring the International Criminal Court Frame-
work to Advance Transitional Justice: A Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 182, 195 (2006) (stating that "while punishing the perpetrators and
preventing future atrocities are important goals of the system, other objectives, linked
to transitional justice and long-term economic, social and legal development may prove
even more valuable in the prevention of these crimes") (footnotes omitted).
38. Alex de Waal, Tragedy in Darfur: On Understanding and Ending the Horror, Bos-
TON REV., Oct.-Nov. 2004, available at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.5/dewaal.
html.
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on the edge of anarchy where violence is viewed as a legitimate
means to attain desired objectives.39 In a fledgling democracy
fractured along ethnic lines with a history of mutual ethnic hos-
tilities and reciprocal hatreds, international criminal prosecu-
tions may end up becoming an impetus for, not a deterrent to,
extra-legal violent conduct.40 Some warlords have apocalyptic
goals and readily resort to violence to mold the society according
to their image. Faced with the threat of prosecution, and sens-
ing their inability to negotiate with a determined world commu-
nity, warlords with everything to lose may decide that it is in their
best interest to fight till the end.41 The consequences of prose-
cuting determined war lords "may be continued tyranny or
bloodshed. '4 2 Also, criminal trials have adverse impacts on rela-
tionships. They often involve accusations and counter-accusa-
tions, rehashing of facts that rekindle old hostilities and reignit-
ing passions that ultimately make reconciliation difficult.43
Third, the causes of violence in Africa are considerably dif-
ferent from what leads to deviant behavior in developed societies
and are more difficult to address via criminal trials.' The dy-
namics of violence in Africa challenge the expectations of a
39. See infta notes 303-22 and accompanying text.
40. Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L.Q. 777, 817-27 (arguing that in certain circum-
stances, international criminal tribunals might actually exacerbate humanitarian atroci-
ties by prosecuting individuals whose political cooperation is critical to a successful
peace negotiation in weak states).
41. Another incentive for the warlords to continue with their insurgency is that if
they survive initial condemnation by the world community and hold their grounds, the
international community will encourage the ruling government to negotiate with them.
See Tull & Mehler, supra note 7, at 376 (finding that over the past fifteen years, power-
sharing agreements between embattled incumbents and insurgents have emerged as
the West's preferred instrument of peace-making in Africa. In almost every country in
which insurgent leaders mustered sufficient military power to attract the attention of
foreign states, they were included in "government of national unity"). For an excellent
analysis of power sharing with warlords in Africa, seeJeremy I. Levitt, Illegal Practice: An
Inquiry into the Legality of Power Sharing With War Lords and Rebels, 27 MICH. J. INr'L L. 495
(2006).
42. Eric Blumenson, The Challenges of A Global Standard of Justice: Peace Pluralism
and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 803
(2006).
43. See generally Jason Benjamin Fink, Deontological Retributivism and the Legal Practice
of InternationalJurisprudence: The Case of the International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, 49
J. AYR. L. 101 (2005) (noting that international criminal jurisprudence often sacrifices
the possibility of reconciliation for the normative framework entailed by retribution).
44. See infra notes 229-266 and accompanying text.
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Western criminal justice model and raise serious questions about
the assumptions that undergird criminal prosecution.4 5 Vio-
lence in Africa is the product of a different phenomenon. Vio-
lence that has disfigured Africa, the kinds witnessed in Rwanda,
Sudan and Sierra Leone, for example, result not from deviant
behavior of citizens but from tensions at the armature of the so-
ciety: ethnic distrust. Its dynamism is sustained by the belief
that violence in defense of ethnic interests is a moral imperative,
even a legal obligation.46 Decades of ethnic distrust and rivalries
coupled with the central government's inability to deal fairly
with the ethnic groups provide further impetus for the apocalyp-
tic dynamism of violence.4" Traditional notions of the criminal
process fail to address the broad range of ways in which situa-
tional cultural pressures exacerbate violence. Violence created
by underlying social problems and perpetrated by several citi-
zens with varying degrees of culpability cannot be addressed by
criminal prosecution designed to address individual miscon-
duct.4" The Western criminal process is scarcely appropriate in
cases where "hundreds or thousands of people participate in an
orgy of mass violence"49 and where the causes of deviant conduct
reside not at the individual level but at the communal level.5°
Moreover, whether international criminal prosecution actually
45. See generally Howland & Calathes, supra note 35 (discussing the relevance of
traditional theories of punishment in the context of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda).
46. See infra notes 285-296 and accompanying text.
47. William R. Ochieng, Foreword to CONFLICT IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA i (P. God-
frey Okoth & Bethwell A. Ogot eds., 2000) ("The flare-ups into violence, that sometimes
end up in coups and rebellions in Africa, are often attempts by class, or nationality, to
expropriate the little wealth that exists and to deprive others.").
48. See Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP. 73, 79 (2002). Professor Daly advances two reasons why criminal prosecu-
tion cannot adequately deal with wrongs in post-conflict societies. "First the nature of
injustice in these contexts is not necessarily conducive to correction by retribution or
punishment. Second, the need for justice may be felt throughout the society at large
and not just in the isolated arenas that are the locus of retributive justice." Id.
49. Mark R. Amstutz, Is Reconciliation Possible After Genocide: The Case of Rwanda, 48
J. CHURCH & ST. 541, 554 (2006).
50. See Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 158.
The ICTR's attempt to apply individual level justice to promote social order
will not and cannot work. Individual level punishments can only affect a per-
manent change if the cause of the deviant behavior resides solely with the
individual. In Rwanda, however, it is impossible to conclude that the causes of
deviance reside with the individual. As the ICTR is focusing its attention on
individual deviants, it is presenting the world, and the Rwandans, with the
2008]
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serves as a deterrent is unclear because its effect cannot be em-
pirically verified.5'
Fourth, the effectiveness of international criminal prosecu-
tions depends on support both from the public and state govern-
ments. Public support has been low because of negative atti-
tudes towards the West shaped by historical circumstances, espe-
cially the adverse effects of colonialism.52 Public support
continues to dwindle because of prevailing attitudes which view
international criminal tribunals as agents and symptoms of impe-
rialism, and as attempts by the West to reestablish its sovereignty
over Africa. 3 The effectiveness of international criminal prose-
cutions also depends on support from state governments, which
has been less than enthusiastic.54 African leaders are reluctant
to support the prosecution of their benefactors, tribesmen or
warlords who have the capacity to cause troubles for their
fledgling government.55 Whether ad hoc or permanent, interna-
tional criminal tribunals based on Western notions ofjustice, op-
erating under the fog of skepticism, increasing popular dissatis-
faction, and mounting hostility from state governments, can do
very little to reestablish social equilibrium and arrest the advanc-
ing decrepitude threatening to engulf Africa.
For all these reasons, or in some combination, international
criminal prosecutions have neither delivered on the promise of
social equilibrium nor served as a chastening influence on impu-
nity in Africa.56 Ralph Zacklin, U.N. Assistant Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs, expressed the views widely shared by scholars
image of a person who needs correcting through punishment instead of a
social system that needs reorganization.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
51. An assessment of the deterrent values of international criminal prosecutions
can only be made by conjecture or speculation. As Professor Blumenson observes, "it is
notoriously difficult to determine whether a past regime of punishment had subsequent
deterrent effects." Blumenson, supra note 42, at 822.
52. A justice system functions optimally when it enjoys the support, confidence
and respect of the citizens. See U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Redesign Panel on the
United Nations System of Administration ofJustice, 8, U.N. Doc. A/61/205 (July 28, 2006).
53. The hybrid tribunal in Sierra Leone did not adequately counter public percep-
tion that international criminal prosecutions represent attempts by the West to impose
its preferences on Africa.
54. See infra notes 172-206 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 178-89 and accompanying text.
56. ICTR has its fair share of critics. See Allison Corey & Sandra F.Joireman, Retrib-
utivejustice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 103 AFR. AFF., 73, 81 (2004) ("The failures of
the tribunal for Rwanda far outweigh its benefits. Its goal is only to prosecute the lead-
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and human rights practitioners when he stated that "the ad hoc
tribunals have been too costly, too inefficient, and too ineffec-
tive. As a mechanism for dealing with justice in post-conflict so-
cieties, they exemplify an approach that is no longer politically
or financially viable." 7 This Article is divided into two broad
parts. Part I examines the values of criminal prosecution. It ac-
knowledges that international criminal prosecution can play sig-
nificant roles in promoting accountability in Africa, so long as it
is properly structured and undertaken with some sensitivity to
the sentiments and feelings of Africans who live with the painful
realities of violence.58 Wholesale adoption of Western models of
justice will not work in Africa given the prevailing social, political
and cultural realities." Concerns for accountability offer no li-
cense for the international community to arrogate to itself the
right to determine what is best for Africa.6 ° It argues that impos-
ing the preferences of the international community without due
consultations with affected African nations will revive poignant
painful memories of colonialism and reignite negative senti-
ments that will ultimately undermine efforts to promote ac-
countability.61
Part II examines the limitations of criminal trials. This por-
tion presents a clear and rich exploration of the causes of vio-
lence in Africa and explains why international criminal law has
not delivered as promised. It offers some explanations of factors
that undermine the effectiveness of international criminal prose-
ers of the genocide, but the process has been so excruciatingly slow and the mandate so
narrow that it is an insufficient and inadequate response to the need for justice.").
57. Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT'L CrIM.
JUST. 541, 542 (2004).
58. In a case study of the accountability mechanisms set up to deal with Rwandan
genocide, Philip Drew advised that it must be kept in mind that not all societies are the
same. International (and national) responses to issues such as those in Rwanda need to
be sensitive to both the differences and commonalities between various societies and
their concepts of law." Philip Drew, Dealing with Mass Atrocities and Ethnic Violence:
Can Alternative Forms of Justice be Effective? A Case Study of Rwanda (2000) (unpub-
lished study), available at http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/full-text/rwanda.htm.
59. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
60. Miriam Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Under-
standing Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 46 (2002) (arguing that "those
who have not suffered cannot presume to determine for those who have what should be
attempted through transitional justice").
61. See Fink, supra note 43, at 124-25 (discussing the unsuitability of Western jus-
tice systems to Rwanda, the author commented that that the international community
may have committed itself to a model of legal imperialism).
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cutions, namely attitudinal, environmental factors, lack of coop-
eration from state governments, and limits of criminal prosecu-
tion. It urges all those involved in the fight against impunity in
Africa to rethink the deeply flawed assumptions about the capac-
ity of international law to bring about transformative changes in
the conduct of citizens and group relations in Africa. Violence is
so interwoven with the maladies in the continent-corruption,
poverty, ethnic tensions-that it is doubtful if criminal prosecu-
tions alone can serve as a chastening influence on the behavior
of the leaders or the citizens trapped within the society. Build-
ing an effective strategy to reestablish social order in post-con-
flict African societies requires an understanding of the idiosyn-
cratic environmental factors that animate violence, as well as rec-
ognition that criminal prosecutions cannot address the social
pathologies that have disfigured Africa. It is these pathologies
that will define and shape Africa's future, not the legacy of crimi-
nal prosecutions.
This Article concludes that a single-minded pursuit of crimi-
nal prosecutions as the sole panacea to impunity in Africa, re-
gardless of the anguishing realities, carries the dangerous and
unacceptably high risk of further deterioration, anarchy and
bloodshed in Africa.62 It is important, therefore, to confect a
strategy that can simultaneously promote accountability and ad-
dress the social pathologies that undermine efforts to reestablish
social equilibrium and reconciliation.
I. VALUES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Proponents of international criminal trials contend that
prosecutions are pertinent to efforts to restore social equilib-
rium and are even more vital to the international community's
efforts to deal with the culture of impunity that threatens to dis-
figure Africa.6 3 Protagonists of international criminal prosecu-
62. See Adam Smith, Transitional Justice in Iraq: The Iraqi Special Tribunal and the
Future of a Nation, 14 INT'L AFF. 5, 6 (2005) (noting that the international community
has become enthralled with criminal justice as the solution to atrocity crimes and in so
doing has lost sight of the inherent risks and difficulties, logistical and otherwise of
running such tribunals).
63. The preamble to the ICC Statute captures the reasons for the establishment of
the court. The preamble, inter alia, "determined to put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes." See
ICC Statute, supra note 24, pmbl. Several scholars have offered different perspectives
on the need for criminal trials. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 27, at 2542 (arguing
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tions and those affiliated with the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda ("ICTR") recite four main reasons for interna-
tional criminal prosecutions: deterrence, incapacitation, moral
education, and substitution for vigilantism.6 4 Jack Snyder and
Leslie Vinjamuri present an admirable summary of the three rea-
sons endlessly advanced by the proponents of international crim-
inal trials to justify the need for international criminal prosecu-
tions:
First, trials send a strong signal to would-be perpetrators of
atrocities that they will be held individually accountable for
their actions .... Second, trials strengthen the rule of law by
teaching both elites and masses that the appropriate means of
resolving conflict is through impartial justice .... Third, tri-
als emphasize the guilt of particular individuals and thereby
defuse the potential of future cycles of violence between eth-
nic groups."
International criminal prosecutions underscore the need
for accountability in a culture mired in impunity.6 6 Scholars,
that trials may "inspire societies that are reexamining their basic values to affirm the
fundamental principles of respect for the rule of law and for the inherent dignity of
individuals").
64. MINOw, supra note 27, at 122 (stating that trials may convert the impulse for
revenge into state managed truth-seeking punishment); see also ARYEH NEIER, WAR
CRIMES 81-84 (1998) (listing deterrence, retribution and incapacitation as the purposes
of criminal punishment); Developments in the Law-The Promises of International Prosecu-
tion, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1957, 1961-69 (2001) [hereinafter The Promises of International
Prosecution] (listing incapacitation, general deterrence, moral education and the rule of
law, and alternatives to vigilantism as four manifestations of prevention); Mark A.
Drumbl, Law and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 OHIO. N.U. L. REv. 41, 46-50
(2005) (noting that criminal trials aspire to exact retribution, promote reconciliation,
deter future violence, express victim's outrage, maintain peace, and cultivate a culture
of human rights); Sharf & Rodley, supra note 27, at 90 (prosecutions for gross human
rights abuses "can discourage future human rights abuses, curtail vigilante justice, and
reinforce respect for law and the new democratic government").
65. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principles and Pragmatism in
Strategies of International Justice, 28 Ir'L SECURITY 5, 17 (2003).
66. Chris Maina Peter, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Bringing the
Killers to Book, 37 IN-r'L REv. RED CROSS (No. 321) 695, available at www.icrc.org/Web/
Eng/siteengO.nsf/html. Extolling the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, Professor Chris Peter stated:
The establishment of the Rwanda Tribunal is even more significant in Africa
itself, where its presence on the continent will help raise people's awareness of
the importance and value of human life. Serious crimes have been committed
against the African people by all sorts of dictators, and so far they seem to be
getting away with it .... The establishment of the Rwanda Tribunal in Arusha
has thus come as an unpleasant surprise for the power-hungry leadership in
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human rights advocates, and United Nations officials all seem to
agree that the future stability of Africa, deepening the rule of
law, and eradicating the culture of impunity, can only be guaran-
teed by holding perpetrators of evil accountable for their trans-
gressions." The nature of some crimes and the circumstances of
their commission demand the attention and involvement of the
international community. 68
The conditions in Africa-weak and dysfunctional institu-
tions, ethnic tensions, corruption, and a central government un-
able or unwilling to address the atrocities of former leaders-
make the establishment of international criminal tribunals justi-
fied, and perhaps necessary.69 Most post-conflict societies are
wistful about prosecuting evildoers but the reality is that "many
Africa. It is a clear signal from the international community that human life is
precarious, that it should be respected and protected, and that those who
abuse it will be held responsible and be sought wherever they are hiding.
Id.
67. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EuR. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1998);
David Dyzenhaus, Debating South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. To-
RONTO L.J. 311, 311 (1999); Chris McMorran, International War Crimes Tribunals, BEYOND
INTRACTABILITY, July 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/int-war crime_
tribunals (stating that for a country attempting to make a transition from a repressive
regime to a democracy, war crimes tribunals offer citizens and leaders the opportunity
to put their faith in an equitable rule of law); Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreward to GOLD-
STONE, supra note 17, at xi ("The rule of law is generally vindicated by holding trans-
gressors accountable for their actions through prosecution and punishment."); Oren-
tiicher, supra note 27, at 2542 (arguing that criminal prosecution is the most effective
insurance against future repression).
The pursuit of retributive justice in a transition to democracy is thought to be
important, not only because of the intrinsic worth of doing justice, but also
because the enactment by the courts of the rituals of retributive justice will
educate society in the practices of the rule of law that are crucial to the stabil-
ity of democracy.
Dyzenhaus, supra note 67, at 311.
68. Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of Na-
tional Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 401 (1998)
(stating that one circumstance necessitating creation of an ad hoc tribunal is that "in
which national court proceedings would not lead to an impartial trial for serious inter-
national crimes").
69. Compare Danilo Zolo, Peace Through Criminal Law?, 2 J. INT'L CrIM. JUST. 727,
730 (2004) (most serious war crimes and crimes against humanity tend to remain un-
punished because of the connivance, ineptitude, or the lack of concern of the national
courts), with Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability After Conflict: What Impact on
Building the Rule of Law?, 38 GEo.J. INT'L L. 251, 252 (2007) (noting that in the wake of
violent conflicts, national justice systems, if they function effectively at all, usually have
only limited ability to render fair justice).
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fledgling democracies have simply not had the power, popular
support, legal tools, or conditions necessary to prosecute effec-
tively."7 Post-conflict societies, for a variety of reasons ranging
from lack of political will, security concerns, dysfunctional judi-
cial infrastructure to corruption,7 1 are either unable or unwilling
to prosecute perpetrators of evil. 72 Even when they can prose-
cute, scholarship and research show that governments in those
states are inflicted with corruption and a lack of basic infrastruc-
ture that disable them from administering justice that meets uni-
versally-accepted standards of a fair trial.73 Government officials
who make the decisions whether or not to prosecute perpetra-
tors of evil tend to be indulgent toward their friends and sup-
porters and easily manipulate the legal process to achieve pre-
70. Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of Pros-
ecution and Truth Commissions, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 84 (1996).
71. In Rwanda, for example, the genocide decimated the legal and judicial infra-
structure. See, e.g., Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan NationalJustice System in Deal-
ing With Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 172 (2000) (stating that it was
discovered that "out of the 800 lawyers and judges of the national and provincial courts,
only 40 were alive and in the country after 1994"); Pemille Ironside, Rwandan Gacaca:
Seeking Alternative Means to Justice, Peace and Reconciliation, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 31, 37
(2002) (noting that Rwanda's judicial sector was virtually annihilated by the genocide,
in both structural and human terms); see also H. Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction
of a Judicial System: The United Nations Mission in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
46 (2001) (describing the destruction of the judicial system by the crisis in Kosovo).
72. Ivan Simonovic states that:
In post-conflict and transition societies, it is often very difficult to (re) establish
the rule of law - and especially to start that process with national proceedings
for past war crimes and human rights abuses. In some cases political will is
lacking, while in other cases the justice system itself has been involved in op-
pression, infrastructure has been destroyed, or qualified personnel have been
killed or have left the country.
Ivan Simonovic, Attitudes and Types of Reaction Toward Past War Crimes and Human Rights
Abuses, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 343, 356-57 (2004); see also KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU,
RWANDA'S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 37 (2005) (hereinafter
RWANDA'S GENOCIDE). In the former Yugoslavia, it would have been inconceivable in
1993 that any national court would put senior political or military figures on trial for
the crimes that accompanied the break up of the country. In Rwanda, the infrastruc-
ture for such an effort simply did not exist. The Rwandan government's willingness to
put members of its own forces on trial for committing mass atrocities was debatable. Id.
73. See Amnesty Int'l, Rwanda: The Troubled Course ofJustice, Al Index AFR 47/10/
00, Apr. 2000 (examining and detailing problems encountered by Rwandan courts try-
ing defendants charged with genocide); L. Danielle Tully, Human Rights Compliance and
the GacacaJurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 385, 402 (2003) (stating
that the utter devastation of the genocide has made adhering to international fair trial
standards "nearly impossible").
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ordained outcomes."4 Attempts by such states to prosecute per-
petrators of evil often elicit complaints and criticisms, especially
from defendants and their supporters who accuse the govern-
ment of using the machinery of justice to settle old scores, and
to intimidate political opponents. 75 In some cases, top govern-
ment officials bear some complicity in the violence that com-
promises their ability to fairly and objectively deliver justice to
the society. 76 Efforts to promote accountability often lead to
"sham trials by insincere regimes implicated in the very atrocities
adjudicated or political show trials by successor regimes bent on
vengeance instead of justice. 77
An international tribunal far removed from the cultural syn-
thesis that led to atrocities is in a better position than domestic
courts to hold accountable "violent aggressors who fall through
the cracks (or gaping holes) of national justice systems because
their governments are either unwilling or unable to pursue crim-
inal sanctions."78 Also, an international tribunal is better able to
effectively address the aftermath of mass violence, especially the
74. See Richard Sannerholm, Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post-Conflict
Societies: Beyond the Rule of Law Template, 12J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 65, 71 (2007) ("In
many cases, the legal and administrative system also suffers from a lack of indepen-
dence due to an entrenched tradition of executive interference.").
75. See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence and the Limits of International Justice, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 483 (1999) (noting that some may perceive national trials as
illegitimate and "a case of victor's justice"); see also Louise Arbour, The Legal Profession
and Human Rights: Progress and Challenges in International Criminal Justice, 21 FoRDHaM
INT'L L.J. 531, 534 (1997) (noting that in both Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the national
justice system was too incapacitated to deal with atrocities); Madeline H. Morris, The
Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 371
(1997) (noting that defendants in national courts will have more reason than defend-
ants tried before an international tribunal to fear bias in the form of victor's justice or
of personal partiality); Stromseth, supra note 69, at 252 (arguing that even when crimi-
nal trials are initiated against perpetrators, those facing trial and their political allies
may view the proceedings as illegitimate forms of "victor justice").
76. Patricia M. Wald, International Criminal Courts-A Stormy Adolescence, 46 VA. J.
INT'L L. 319, 331 (2006).
Recent experiences in other benighted countries recovering from civil wars
give little cause for optimism that states can be counted on to vindicate war
crimes on their own. The leaders in such countries are usually partisans of the
winning side and have little impetus to go after their own friends and follow-
ers.
Id.
77. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons From Rwanda, 24 YALE J.
INr'L L. 365, 370 (1999).
78. Jamie Mayerfield, Ending Impunity, 20 ETHICS & INT'L An'. 361, 361 (2006).
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prosecution of high-level perpetrators of evil.79 An international
tribunal is more cognizant of prevailing human rights norms
and is able to conform these norms to the realities of a highly
dynamic and volatile environment like Africa.80 For example,
the ICTR's successful prosecution of rape as a crime against hu-
manity attests to the creative use of existing human rights norms
to promote decency in the continent of Africa.81 The judgments
of international criminal tribunals enjoy greater credibility and
respect than judgments of domestic courts.8 2 An international
criminal tribunal may be capable of administering justice shorn
of the problems faced by domestic courts.83 It is impartial, often
better financed and staffed, and generally has more resources
79. See Zolo, supra note 69, at 728. Comparing international tribunals to domestic
courts, Zolo states:
[I]nternational tribunals can prosecute war crimes and crimes against human-
ity much more effectively. For domestic tribunals are not willing to act against
crimes lacking relevant national or territorial links with the state. Moreover,
international courts are technically more skilled than domestic courts in ascer-
taining and construing international law, are more impartial in trying crimes
and more likely to apply uniform judicial standards. In addition, as interna-
tional trials are much more visible in the media, they are more effective in
expressing the will of the international community to punish those guilty of
serious international crimes, and their sentences perform a clearer function as
a public reprimand of those convicted.
Id.
80. See RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, supra note 72, at 29 (noting that an international tri-
bunal would have a better familiarity with the "techniques and substance of interna-
tional law").
81. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 731
(Sept. 2, 1998), available at http://www.ictr.org/english/cases/Akayesu/judgment/
akay001.htm. The court held in Akayesu's case that rape could come within the defini-
tion of genocide. For a detailed analysis of the Akayesu case, see Margeret A. Lyons,
Hearing The Cry Without Answering the Call: Rape, Genocide, and the Rwandan Tribunal, 28
SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & COM. 99 (2001).
82. See Maya Goldstein-Bolocan, Rwanda Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Jus-
tice, 2004J. Disp. RESOL. 355, 359 (2005) ("Justice dispensed through international fo-
rums will also have a broader, more powerful impact than a domestic process.").
83. Describing the advantages of international tribunals over domestic courts,
Antonio Cassese states:
[T]hey are less destabilizing to fragile governments, are less likely to cede to
"short-term objectives of national politics," can count on the expertise of ju-
rists who are better qualified and able to progressively develop international
law, are more impartial than proceedings adjudicated by judges "caught up in
the milieu which is the subject of trials," are more likely to be respected by
national authorities, can investigate crimes with ramifications in many states
more easily, and can tender more uniform justice.
Cassese, supra note 67, at 9-10.
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than domestic courts to bring perpetrators of evil to justice.84
More importantly, an international tribunal is better able to ap-
prehend or demand the apprehension of criminals who flee to
other countries.
85
International criminal prosecution, therefore, serves as a vi-
able, effective and "plausible backdrop when national justice
fails or the perpetrators flee." 6 Michael Ignalieff's raison detre
for international criminal tribunals bears repeating:
[T] he best rationale for international justice is that it steps in
when national justice faces a crime that is too political, too
massive, too difficult to try in its own court. International jus-
tice should be a defaultjurisdiction whose legitimacy depends
entirely on the inability or incapacity of a national court to
take on its obligation.
8 7
Similar sentiments were expressed by Adama Dieng, former Reg-
istrar of the ICTR, who urged the world to respond "where a
country in which mass crimes occur is not able or is unwilling to
render justice, for lack either of strong judicial institutions or of
political will because the crimes were perpetuated by the author-
ities in power."88
Other ambitious aims of international trials include using
prosecution of selected perpetrators of evil to facilitate reconcili-
ation." The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
("ICTY') Trial Chamber stated in Prosecutor v. Erdemovi:90
84. See Wald, supra note 76, at 329 (" [T] he hard facts are that most war-torn coun-
tries, especially those whose citizens live in abject poverty, do not have the will or re-
sources to bring the worst wartime violators to justice promptly and fairly.").
85. See RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, supra note 72, at 153-56 (providing a detailed account
of the hot pursuit and extradition of fugitives by international criminal tribunals).
86. Reed Brody, Justice: The First Casualty of Truth?, NATION, Apr. 30, 2001, at 25,
26.
87. Michael Ignatieff, We Are Not The World, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 13, 2001, at 14, 14.
88. Adama Dieng, Africa Needs the Laws and Courts to Punish Their War Lords, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 21, 2001, at 6.
89. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and
the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & POL. 583, 601 (2007).
Advocates hope that by exposing the truth about atrocities, subjecting a select
group of perpetrators to highly public criminal trials whose procedures reflect
fair and impartial process, and providing some measure of justice to victims
while emphasizing individual over collective responsibility, tribunals will help
break cycles of violence, delegitimize criminal regimes, and promote transi-
tions to peaceful liberal societies rooted in the rule of law.
Id.
90. Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment (Nov. 29, 1996).
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The International Tribunal, in addition to its mandate to in-
vestigate, prosecute and punish serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law, has a duty, through its judicial func-
tions, to contribute to the settlement of the wider issues of
accountability, reconciliation and establishing the truth be-
hind the evils perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia. Discover-
ing the truth is the cornerstone of the rule of law and a fun-
damental step on the way to reconciliation: for it is the truth
that cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins the
healing process." l
A significant achievement of international criminal prosecu-
tions is the erosion of the concept of head-of-state immunity, a
fulcrum on which African tyrants and despots luxuriate. 2 The
international community, through the criminal tribunals, sent a
clear and emphatic message to heads of state, tyrants, and would-
be dictators in Africa, that they cannot hide behind the niceties
of sovereignty to engage in atrocious crimes against their fellow
citizens. It made it tolerably clear that genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity are forms of evil that transcend national
sovereignty.
93
As demonstrated by the ICTR's conviction of former
Rwandan Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda, 4 and the recent in-
dictment of Charles Taylor,"5 official positions will not and do
not absolve presidents and senior government officials of crimi-
nal responsibility for certain crimes. Because of the work of the
91. Id. 21.
92. See Erik Mose, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT'L CrM. JUST. 920, 932
(2005) (discussing the achievements of the ICTR and stating that the ICTR reaffirmed
the principle that no individual enjoys impunity on account of an official position).
93. Richard Goldstone, former prosecutor of the ICTR, offers a compelling reason
why the world must respond to atrocities committed by the state and its officials. He
states that:
[A] new species of criminal offence-crimes against humanity-gave birth to
universal jurisdiction. It was a new idea that some crimes were so horrendous
that they were crimes not only against the immediate victims or solely the peo-
ple who lived in the country in which they were committed; they were truly
crimes against all mankind.
Richard J. Goldstone, Foreword: The Role of Law and Justice in Governance: Regional and
Global to FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY. THE SEARCH
FOR JUSTICE IN A WORLD OF STATES viii-ix (Ramesh Thakur & Peter Malcontent eds.,
2004).
94. See Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sen-
tence (Sept. 4, 1998). This judgment was upheld by the ICTR Appeals Chambers. See
Jean Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-23-A, Judgment (Oct. 19, 2000).
95. See, e.g., Simons, supra, note 24.
2008]
364 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 31:343
ICTR and lately the ICC, national leaders, warlords, and would-
be tyrants now operate with a heightened awareness of their
criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes
and genocide. The existence of a mechanism with global reach
sends powerful messages to African despots and tyrants that
never again "will a torturer or genocidal head of state assume
that violations of international criminal law will go unpun-
ished."96
It has been argued that without criminal prosecutions, ty-
rants and would-be perpetrators would have no incentive to con-
strain their conduct.97 Inaction or indifference will further em-
bolden tyrants and expose helpless citizens to the predations of
their rulers.98 Successfully prosecuting past violators helps to
bolster the government's legitimacy, reassures its citizens, and
helps deepen the rule of law.99 Kofi Annan, the then Secretary-
General of the United Nations, following the first genocide con-
96. Reed Brody, One Year Later, "The Pinochet Precedent" Puts Tyrants on Notice, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 1999, at A19; see also Theodor Meron, International Criminalization
of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 554, 555 (1995) (noting that no matter how many
atrocities cases these tribunals may eventually try, their very existence sends a powerful
message).
97. See Tull & Mehler, supra note 7, at 395 ("[E]fforts to promote accountability
and legitimacy in the field of conflict resolution will not prevent violent entrepreneurs
from conquering state power, but they are at least a step to limiting the lawlessness and
impunity that characterizes insurgency-affected countries even after the conflict is ter-
minated.").
98. Urging the criminal prosecution of those responsible for the atrocities in Dar-
fur, Human Rights Watch states that the "threat of serious criminal prosecution would
send a powerful message to those responsible for the atrocities in Darfur ... and help
deter attacks on civilians." Human Rights Watch, U.N.: Pass Resolution to Refer Darfur to
ICC," HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, Mar. 25, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/25/
sudan10371.htm.
99. See Donald L. Hafner & Elizabeth B.L. King, Beyond Traditional Notions of Transi-
tional Justice: How Trials, Truth Commissions and Other Tools for Accountability Can and
Should Work, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 91, 92-93 (2007). Discussing the values of
prosecuting those who took part in genocide and war crimes, Hafner and King state:
Criminal prosecutions of crimes of this magnitude not only punish the individ-
ual who committed them, demonstrating that impunity does not exist, but also
help to restore dignity to their victims .... By holding individuals responsible
for their misdeeds, criminal trials may also deter the commission of abuses in
the future. Moreover, if conducted in strict accordance with legal due pro-
cess, criminal prosecutions of war crimes can help to strengthen the rule of
law and establish the truth about the past through accepted legal means.
Id. (quoting Timothy Phillips & Mary Albon, When Prosecution Is Not Possible: Alternative
Means of Seeking Accountability for War Crimes, in WAR CRims: THE LEGALITY OF NUREM-
BERG 244, 244 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999)).
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viction by the ICTR, reflected optimistically on the role of inter-
national criminal prosecutions in post-conflict societies:
I speak for the entire international community when I ex-
press the hope that this judgment will contribute to the long-
term process of national reconciliation in Rwanda. For there
can be no healing without peace; there can be no peace with-
out justice; and there can be no justice without respect for
human rights and rule of law.100
II. PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS IN AFRICA
The objectives of criminal prosecutions are worthy, indeed
laudable goals, because in appropriate cases, punishing evildoers
is a prerequisite for the establishment of the rule of law.1"1 This
portion of the Article evaluates the effectiveness of international
criminal prosecutions against the purposes stated above. I argue
that though the ICTR has made significant contributions to the
search for accountability in Africa, its relevance has been under-
mined by the following problems: attitudinal problems, environ-
mental factors, lack of cooperation from state governments, and
the limits of criminal law. 10 2
A. Attitudinal Problems
The success of international criminal prosecution and the
ability to achieve the stated objectives of reconciliation and de-
terrence ultimately depend on the support and acceptance by
the public whose conduct it seeks to influence. 10 3  Unfortu-
nately, the persistence and pervasiveness of anti-Western senti-
100. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Welcomes Rwanda Tribu-
nal's Genocide Judgement as Landmark in International Criminal Law, U.N. Doc. SG/
SM/6687L/2896 (Sept. 2, 1998).
101. Democracy will not be deepened unless citizens understand that actions have
consequences and that no citizen is above the law. In pushing for the prosecution of
generals responsible for human rights abuses in Argentina, President Alfonsin stated:
[O]ur intention was not so much to punish as to prevent; to insure that what
had happened could not happen in the future .... Our principal objective
was not to obtain retribution for every wrong but to prevent the recurrence of
similar wrongs in the future by internalizing in the collective conscience the
idea that no group, however powerful it might be, is beyond the law.
Raul Alfonsin, Never Again, 4J. DEMOCRACY 15, 16 (1993).
102. Other problems like inadequate funding and lack of logistical support are
beyond the scope of this study.
103. See supra note 52.
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ment continues to foster a climate of public opinion unreceptive
to the activities of international criminal tribunals in Africa. In-
ternational criminal prosecutions are treated with suspicion,
even hostility, by a vast majority of Africans, partly because they
are viewed as another symptom of the deep-seated paternalism
that pervades much of the West's dealing with Africa and partly
because the model of justice implicit in the ICTR and sought by
the West is inconsistent with traditional notions of justice.1 °4
Lingering accusations of paternalism disaffect the citizens and
diminish the already low level of interest in anything sponsored
by the West. Inevitably and even perfunctorily, some Africans
resent and distrust international criminal tribunals. They con-
tinue to question the ability and integrity of international crimi-
nal tribunals to dispense justice in Africa. Resentment springs
from two different bases-one selfish, the other cultural. Lead-
ers, as potential defendants in future international criminal tri-
als, resent the notion of foreign intrusion into their domain.
The political elites, moved more by calculations of self-interest
than the well-being of their citizens, resort to blackmail to dis-
credit international efforts to promote accountability."' ° Black-
mail often resonates with the masses, most of whom continue to
roil over the pain suffered during colonialism.10 6 Facile disdain
for the West continues to evoke negative sentiments and atti-
tudes that undermine the effectiveness of international criminal
law.
Citizens, most of whom have long-standing complaints
about the attitude of the West towards Africa, view international
criminal law with skepticism. They deride international criminal
prosecutions as judicial colonialism, imperial condescension, or
worse, as ersatz efforts by the West to imbricate its failure to pre-
vent tu quoque violence that continues to disfigure Africa.'
104. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
105. A typical example is the attempt by the Sudanese government to portray the
ICC indictment of Sudanese officials as an effort to discredit Muslims. See infra note 179
and accompanying text.
106. See David Crane, White Man's Justice: Applying International Justice After Regional
Third World Conflicts, 27 CAlIozo L. REV. 1683, 1686 (2005-2006) (stating that "African
leaders can easily manipulate popular thinking by loudly declaring that the justice be-
ing imposed (and threatening the status quo or a leader's power) is 'white man's jus-
tice,' playing upon the fears of colonialism as a way of excusing the rampant corruption
and impunity that is Africa, particularly West Africa").
107. See Zacklin, supra note 57, at 542 ("The reality is that the [International Crim-
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Amidst allegations of paternalism, bias, and imperial condescen-
sion, most citizens lose sight of what international criminal pros-
ecutions seek to accomplish and are therefore generally dismis-
sive of efforts by international criminal tribunals to promote ac-
countability. Questions about the legitimacy of international
tribunals make it difficult for citizens to respect the verdicts of
the tribunal."' 8 Continuing disdain for the tribunals under-
mines the tribunal's ability to attain the professed goal of pro-
moting reconciliation. 0 9
Contempt for international criminal tribunals also reflects a
historical discomfort with the Western-type legal system. The
Western-type legal system, introduced by colonial authorities
and sustained by African countries, generates substantial and
continuing public distrust, especially among the unsophisticated
segments of the society.110 Elaborate substantive and procedural
rules characteristic of the Western legal process are virtually in-
inal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICT")] and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR") were established more as acts of political contrition, because of egre-
gious failures to swiftly confront situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, than
as a part of a deliberate policy, promoting international justice."); see also RwANDA's
GENOCIDE, supra note 72, at 48-49 ("[T]he Arusha tribunal .. was established primarily
as an act of political contrition for the failure of political will to intervene militarily to
halt mass atrocities, and not because there was a proactive, deliberate policy to promote
international justice.").
108. Aloys Habimama, Judicial Responses to Mass Violence: Is International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda Making a Difference Towards Reconciliation in Rwanda, in INTERNA-
TIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIaLs: MAKING A DIFFERENCE? 86 (Steven Ratner & James Bischoff
eds., 2003) (stating that "[c]onstantly exposed to such bitter criticism highlighting the
imperfections of the Tribunal, many Rwandans tend to hold an overwhelmingly nega-
tive opinion of international justice").
109. See David Cohen, "Hybrid"Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia:
"Lessons Learned" and Prospects For the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (2007).
The possibility of trials to have an effect on reconciliation, accountability, and
the promotion of respect for the rule of law depends on effective outreach
and other educational or capacity-building programs. Such success becomes
all the more difficult when the justice process is perceived as taking place in a
foreign court, without the participation of nationals of the countries in ques-
tion. This problem is, of course, compounded when the basic information
about the trials and their results is lacking. For those individuals or groups
linked to the perpetrators, it becomes too easy to dismiss the process as simply
imposed by foreign countries and organizations who have misunderstood what
really happened.
Id.
110. See generally Okechukwu Oko, The Problems and Challenges of Lauwyering in Devel-
oping Societies, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 601-07 (2004) (discussing public disaffection with a
Western-type legal system in Nigeria).
2008]
368 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 31:343
comprehensible to the local inhabitants. Citizens feel no loyalty
to the Western-type legal system that they suspect of being cor-
rupt, unfair, cumbersome, unresponsive to their needs, and gen-
erally inaccessible.'' International criminal tribunals suffer the
same fate and are generally treated with disdain by the local in-
habitants. Citizens, especially the largely unsophisticated and il-
literate segments of the society, do not understand the dynamics
of international criminal prosecutions and, hence, neither re-
spect nor accept the legitimacy of international criminal tribu-
nals, which most of them increasingly regard as agents or instru-
ments of an uncaring or patronizing imperial power. Some citi-
zens confuse the necessary and genuine efforts by the
international community to punish evildoers with attempts to
colonize Africa, this time, via judicial means."1 2
Lack of public support accounts for the disinterest and dis-
missive attitude toward the activities of international criminal
tribunals in Africa. Three factors, namely the nature and prac-
tice of the tribunals, location, and contradictions with the Afri-
can concept of justice, continue to fuel public disenchantment
with international criminal prosecutions in Africa.
B. Practice and Procedure
International criminal tribunals function in ways Africans ei-
ther do not understand or fail to appreciate. 1 3 They are viewed
as an entirely alien system with different laws and principles.
Some Africans believe that the efficacy of international criminal
tribunals is limited by practice and procedure, especially due
process requirements and the non-imposition of the death pen-
alty." 4 International criminal tribunals observe all the due pro-
111. See G.N.K. Vukor-Quarshie, Criminal Justice Administration in Nigeria: Saro
Wiwa in Review, 8 CruM. L.F. 87, 104 (1997). The author stated that:
[T]he criminal justice system that the British bequeathed to Nigeria has cer-
tain objective shortcomings: the system is expensive, inflexible, overly techni-
cal, and elitist. Social and economic disadvantages also "rule out access to the
judicial process for the overwhelming majority of the population; for them the
antiquated informal procedures of conciliation and mediation are the first re-
course in situations of conflict. For the majority, the rights of the official legal
system are unavailable."
Id.
112. See generally Fink, supra note 43.
113. See Carroll, supra note 71, at 172 (attributing Rwandan peoples' frustration
with the ICTR to lack of knowledge and information about ICTR trials).
114. See ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 23.
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cess requirements: the right to counsel, right to confront and
cross examine witnesses, presumption of innocence, and prohi-
bition against self incrimination."' These requirements, taken
for granted in established democracies, often evoke negative
sentiments from Africans, especially victims of mass violence,
and even state governments.116 Citizens convinced of the iden-
tity and guilt of their tormentors cannot understand why a de-
fendant should be acquitted on technical grounds. From the
perspective of most citizens, these technical requirements serve
no useful purpose, save to help guilty defendants escape punish-
ment. For example, the release of one of the principal architects
of the genocide in Rwanda, Jean-Bosco Barayaguiza, because of
the delay in bringing him to trial, elicited widespread condem-
nation from both the government and the people of Rwanda."1 7
Also, the failure to impose the death penalty continues to
fuel antipathy towards the tribunal."1 ' The death penalty, gener-
ally available in most African countries, is not an option in all the
tribunals sponsored by the United Nations. 9 This is consistent
with the prevailing attitude within the United Nations and most
parts of Europe that consider the death penalty barbaric.120 Afri-
can countries have the death penalty in their sentencing arsenal,
and in appropriate cases, and consistent with their laws, impose
the death penalty.' 2 ' Most Africans do not share the European
115. Id. art. 20.
116. See Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 65, at 25 (stating that the government of
Rwanda felt that the ICTR was more concerned with due process and the rights of the
accused than it was with holding leaders of the genocide accountable).
117. See Steven Edwards, Rwandan Genocide Accused Freed by Tribunal, NAT'L POST
(Can.), Nov. 6, 1999, at A15.
118. See Wendy Lambourne, Post Conflict Peace Building: Meeting Human Needs for
Justice and Reconciliation, 4 PEACE, CONFLICT & DEv. 1, 14 (2004) (noting that the ICTR
has been criticized by the Rwandan government for failing to provide justice because of
slow trials and inadequate sentencing).
119. See ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 23 ("the penalty imposed by the trial
chamber shall be limited to imprisonment").
120. See WILLIAM A. ScRABAs, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 2 (2002) (noting that fifty-five years after the Nuremburg trials, the interna-
tional community has now ruled out the possibility of capital punishment in prosecu-
tions for war crimes and crimes against humanity). See generally ROGER HOOD, THE
DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 10 (1989) (surveying the international
community's opposition to the death penalty).
121. See Media Briefing, Amnesty International, Statistics on the Death Penalty in
Africa (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&
id=ENGACT500162005 (indicating that twenty African countries retain and use the
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revulsion with the death penalty and have no qualms with the
death penalty. Indeed, for most Africans, especially the victims
of brutality, the only penalty they seek for their abusers is the
death penalty. To them, any sanction for genocide short of the
death penalty is unacceptable and diminishes the legitimacy of
international criminal tribunals. The Rwandan Ambassador to
the United Nations who cast the lone vote against the establish-
ment of the ICTR "protested the disparity in sentencing pos-
sibilities between the Rwandan penal code, which permitted cap-
ital punishment and the ICTR statute which did not."' 2 2
Sentencing disparity between domestic courts and interna-
tional criminal tribunals elicited criticisms and complaints from
both scholars and the Rwandan people. 123 Perpetrators of evil
processed through the domestic courts receive the death pen-
alty,124 while their luckier and arguably more culpable counter-
parts tried by the ICTR receive terms of imprisonment to be
served in comfortable European prisons. 12
C. Location
The ICTR currently sits in Tanzania pursuant to a provision
in the enabling statute which empowers it to sit outside of
Rwanda as it deems fit. 126 The location of the ICTR in Tanzania
undermines its aim of deterrence, diminishes the legitimacy of
the tribunal and, at a practical level, makes its operations ineffi-
death penalty; twenty retain, but no longer carry out the death penalty; and thirteen
have abolished the death penalty).
122. Jason Strain & Elizabeth Keyes, Accountability in the Aftermath of Rwanda's Geno-
cide, in ACCOUNTABILiTY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 99
(Jane Stromseth ed., 2003).
123. See Morris, supra note 75, at 364 (arguing that it is unfair for high level perpe-
trators to be allowed the benefits of the full panoply of rights afforded defendants in
trials before the ICTR while ordinary perpetrators face imperfect justice within the
Rwandan courts).
124. See RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, supra note 72, at 40 (reporting that in 1998, Rwanda
executed twenty-two persons convicted by domestic courts for their involvement in the
genocide); Jens David Ohlin, Applying The Death Penalty to Crimes of Genocide, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 747, 748 n.12 (2005) (stating that "several defendants convicted of genocide in
Rwanda were eventually executed. Twenty-two of them were executed in cities across
Rwanda on April 24, 1998.").
125. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 77, at 417-18 (noting that those most responsible
for the worst offences "will receive relatively lenient treatment, have their lives spared,
and face, at most, some years in confinement under conditions far better than they
could have anticipated back home").
126. S.C. Res. 977, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1995/977 (Feb. 22, 1995).
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cient.127 The Tribunal is far removed from the people whose
behavior it is intended to influence. The Rwandan envoy to the
United Nations, who vigorously opposed the location of the
ICTR in Tanzania, argued that trials "held hundreds of miles
away from the scene of the crime with no knowledge of
Rwandese people" will undermine the deterrent effect of the tri-
bunal.1 2  Rwanda is a relatively unsophisticated society with little
or no access to events outside its boundaries. 21 Some Rwandans
read about the ICTR proceedings in the newspapers, luckier and
more privileged ones watch excerpts on television. The vast ma-
jority of Rwandans are unfamiliar with the proceedings at the
Tribunal and have no opportunity either to read about it in the
newspapers or watch excerpts of the proceedings on televi-
sion. '3 0
The ICTR was established to hold Rwandans accountable
for atrocities and "to contribute to the process of national recon-
ciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace. "131
To be effective, an international criminal tribunal should be lo-
127. See Lipscomb, supra note 37, at 196 (noting that the "physical distance be-
tween the tribunal and the local population, the inability of the international tribunal
to publicize its work within the ravaged communities, and the complete lack of partici-
pation of local actors have negatively impacted the legitimacy of international courts in
domestic settings" (footnotes omitted)); see also Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and
Reality of War Crime Justice, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 21, 29 (2002) (criticizing the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for its remoteness from the place where
the crimes took place); Jenia lontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law,
41 STAN. J. INr'L L. 1, 24 (2005) ("the history of the ad hoc tribunals reveal that the
remoteness of international tribunals damages their legitimacy and effectiveness with
the local populations").
128. Yacob Haile-Mariam, The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 667, 698 (1997); see also Amstutz, supra note 49, at 553 (arguing that one of the
reasons why ICTR trials have had little impact on Rwanda is because of the location of
the Tribunal in neighboring Tanzania).
129. See Hafner & King, supra note 99, at 104 ("The seat of the ICTR is in Arusha,
Tanzania, and even television broadcasts of the trial in Rwanda cannot bring them close
to the vast majority of Rwandans who lack access to televisions.").
130. See Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 82, at 370-71.
The effectiveness of the tribunal in delivering justice while seeking peace and
reconciliation has indeed been frustrated by its inaccessibility to ordinary
Rwandans. While its location in "neutral" land-Arusha, Tanzania-was to
send a message of impartiality, it makes it in fact impractical-if not impossi-
ble-for Rwandans to attend court proceedings or hear news of ICTR trials.
Id.
131. ICTR Statute, supra note 22, pmbl.
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cated in the country where the violations occur. 13 2 Prospects of
reconciliation are significantly enhanced if justice is adminis-
tered in the affected society. 133 Justice Hassan B. Jallow, the
Chief Prosecutor for the ICTR stated:
[T] he holding of trials in Arusha, Tanzania, far away from the
theatre of genocide distances the people of Rwanda from a
process designed to render justice to its people. For the peo-
ple to feel that justice was being done, the criminal justice
system ought ideally to operate within sight and hearing of
the victims themselves.!
34
By continuing to conduct sessions at Arusha, the ICTR risks
having its work "ignored or dismissed as an alien effort, irrele-
vant to the concerns in the country."1 35 Locating the Tribunal in
another country often results in a feeling of alienation and even
resentment. Citizens do not feel vested in the accountability
process and, consequently, are mostly oblivious to the relevance
of the tribunal. 13 '6 Nothing emphasizes legitimacy of a new re-
gime and deepens the rule of law more than criminal prosecu-
tions undertaken in venues where the crimes occurred. 137
Human Rights Watch succinctly captured the problems of locat-
ing trials outside the countries where the atrocities took place:
132. See Crane, supra note 106, at 1684 (stating that the tribunal should be "in the
location where the international crimes took place, at the scene of the crime" because it
is imperative that the victims see justice done before their eyes).
133. The ICTR's main audience is Rwanda. Kritz aptly stated:
[The people of Rwanda], more than the rest of the world, need to see the
tribunal at work, to be reminded on a daily basis that the international com-
munity is committed to the establishment ofjustice and accountability for the
heinous crimes of 1994.
Neil Kritz, Coming to Terms With Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass
Violations of Human Rights, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 131 (1996).
134. Justice Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, ICTR, Justice After Genocide: The
Challenges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Speech to the Univer-
sity of Lund in Stora Salen, Af-Building Lund (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.
fuf.se/fuf/rapporter/2007/HassanBallowJan2007.pdf.
135. Kritz, supra note 133, at 131.
136. See Haile-Mariam, supra note 128, at 744 (arguing that because of the "prox-
imity of the [Ethiopian Central High Court] trial to the sites of the crimes and the
intimate knowledge people have of the trial, the prosecution and punishment by the
Ethiopian court will have a larger deterrent effect").
137. See RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 8, at 159 (noting that when trials take place
in the country where the offenses occurred, the entire process becomes more deeply
connected with the society, providing it with the potential to create a strong psychologi-
cal and deterrent effect on the population).
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Cases brought before international criminal tribunals or in
national courts (based on universal jurisdiction) are often
tried far away from the crime scene and thus are less accessi-
ble to victims and those in whose name the crimes were com-
mitted. These trials sometimes lack the visibility in the coun-
try where the crimes occurred that a local trial would have.
The states where the crimes occurred, whose government
may include accused war criminals or their confederates, may
oppose the prosecutions, resisting cooperation and making it
difficult to obtain custody of the defendants or obtain evi-
dence. Gathering evidence for crimes that occurred hun-
dreds or thousands of miles away makes it more difficult to
meet the level of proof required for a conviction and for the
accused to develop a comprehensive defense. Another down-
side to distance includes a lack of familiarity with the cultural
and historical context in which the crimes occurred. The
need for translation services also slows the pace of trials and
makes them more costly. 3 8
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, to some degree, ad-
dressed the problem by locating the tribunal in Freetown and
staffing it with a mixture of locals and non-Africans."' But the
International Criminal Court risks a similar fate suffered by the
ICTR because it is located at the Hague, a venue far-removed
from the continent and the people whose lives and affairs it is
supposed to repair.1 4 °
D. African Concept of Justice
Another source of tension is that the Western concept of
justice differs significantly from traditional African notions of
justice. Traditional justice systems place a significant premium
on social harmony, while the Western-type justice system is con-
cerned chiefly with rights of the citizens and punishment of
those who violate the law.14 1 Western-type criminal justice is
138. Richard Dicker & Elise Keppler, Beyond the Hague: The Challenges of Interna-
tional Justice, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ARMED CONFLICT 194, 207-08 (2004).
139. The Special Court for Sierra Leone is structured differently from the ICTR.
Members are drawn from both Sierra Leone and the international community. The
court also incorporates both domestic and international law. See Nmehielle & Jalloh,
supra note 23, at 107-10.
140. See ICC Statute, supra note 24, art. 3.
141. SeeJeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconcilia-
tion in Transitional Societies, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 661, 671-72 (2004). The au-
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contradictory to the spirit of reconciliation, which animates local
conflict resolution mechanisms.1 42 The ICTR emphasizes guilt
and punishment, while the African traditional justice system
stresses reestablishment of social harmony by reconciling the dis-
putants. 4 3 One of the main goals of the justice system in tradi-
tional African society is to reestablish harmony through long dis-
cussions supervised by elders or chiefs.1 44 All the parties to the
conflict are involved in the process and are united by the com-
mon goal and understanding that social equilibrium is far more
important than individual rights.'4 5 Essentially, through exhorta-
tion rather than threat of sanctions, elders challenge, inspire,
and ultimately ensure compliance with social norms. The elders
and chiefs are connoisseurs of social norms and typically use the
thors elegantly described the motivations for and the dynamics of traditional conflict
resolution mechanisms:
The notion of reconciliation has been part of African systems of dispute reso-
lution for centuries. In these traditions, the restoration of balance, rather
than punishment of the guilty, is the main focus of law enforcement. The
group, not the individual, [has] been the traditional unit of African society.
Consequently, legal proceedings are community affairs in which a central aim
is to reconcile the disputing parties, to restore harmonious relationships
within the community, and to compensate the victims.... These proceedings
focus more on the relationship between the parties than the actual event com-
plained of because the underlying objective is to restore harmony within the
community.
Id.
142. See generally TRADITIONAL CURES, supra note 20 (presenting collection of essays
on traditional justice systems in various African countries).
143. See Antony N. Allot, African Law, in AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEMS 145
(J. Duncan & M. Derret eds., 1968) (noting that at the heart of African adjudication lies
the notion of reconciliation or the restoration of harmony and that the job of a court or
an arbitrator is less to find the facts, state the rules of law, and apply them to the facts
than to right a wrong in such a way as to restore the harmony within the disturbed
community).
144. See AMAZU Asouzu, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN STATES 117
(2001). Dr. Asouzu eloquently explains why Africans prefer the traditional mode of
conflict resolution. He states:
African social values and family cohesion dictated a dispute settlement process
that accorded with these traits and ensured economic and social progress.
Family heads and, where they exist, chiefs usually engage in the traditional
peace making effort, the object being not to declare and enforce strict legal
rights but to assuage injured feelings, to restore and to reach a compromise
acceptable to both parties. A greater degree of reconciliation rather than
rigid adjudication is used to diffuse tensions in the family and society, since
tensions in the traditional African society would disrupt the communistic
modes of economic production.
Id. at 15-16 (footnotes omitted).
145. See Sarkin & Daly, supra note 141, at 671.
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platform of adjudication to transmit their wisdom and advice to
the parties. 46 The erring party acknowledges his mistakes, ten-
ders an apology, and in some cases, compensates the victim who
is prodded to forget and forgive. 4 7 The parties leave the process
with a sense of satisfaction and hopes of becoming better mem-
bers of the society. The Honorable Keba M'Baye of Senegal, an
eminent Judge at the International Court of Justice, has noted
that according to African conceptions of law "only reconciliation
can put an end to differences because it produces neither win-
ners nor losers."
148
The Western adjudicatory process, on the other hand, em-
phasizes rights and makes a firm pronouncement of the rights
and responsibilities of the parties. It is an adversarial system in
which the parties are pitted against each other in a fierce and
often bitter attempt to persuade the fact finder to accept their
version of events. The dominant focus of the process is on ascer-
taining the truth and apportioning blame to the offending party.
This process is scarcely concerned with the consequences of its
judgment on the society. The adversarial process, which typi-
cally involves trading accusations and counter-accusations, re-
opens wounds, quickens alliances, and hardens positions. Once
the process is set in motion it becomes difficult, perhaps impossi-
ble to reconcile the parties.149
146. See LaurenceJuma, Africa, its Conflicts and its Traditions: Debating a Suitable Role
for Tradition in African Peace Initiatives, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 417, 495-96 (2005).
The position of elders in African communities has not changed, despite new
political organization. They are still considered paragons of wisdom and com-
mand respectability from the entire membership of the community and be-
yond. In terms of conflict resolution, they are a great repository of first hand
information on the historical aspects of the conflict, its cultural ramifications,
and the actors involved, and can inspire confidence in a cause of action that
seeks to bring peace.
Id.
147. See Agwu Ukiwe Okali, Justice in Africa and the African Diaspora (July 28,
1999) (unpublished paper delivered at the 74th Annual Convention of the United
States National Bar Association held in Philadelphia) (noting that restitutive justice is
an inherent notion ofjustice in African tradition-indeed in these societies, it is often
more important than retribution against an offender).
148. K~ba M'Baye, The African Conception of the Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF COMPARATYvE LAw 138, 147-48 (1974).
149. Helena Cobban, ajournalist with significant practical experience in the areas
of international human rights and transitional justice states that:
In a criminal trial, two sets of facts-those of the prosecution and those of the
defense-do public battle with each other. Those competing facts are probed
and examined in detail and a winner and loser are ultimately decided. When
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Another source of discomfort with the Western model sys-
tem is that citizens whose rights have been violated and who are
often victims of violence often play no roles in the adjudicatory
process. 5 ' Victims are sidelined and participate only minimally
as witnesses who testify under the strict strictures of applicable
evidentiary rules and standards. 5' Kingsley Moghalu, former
spokesperson for the ICTR, expresses concerns that fairly and
accurately reflect the problems with the non-involvement of vic-
tims in the criminal process. He states that:
[T]hese trials have generally focused far more on the rights
of the defendants, which are certainly important, but have ne-
glected those of the victims to restitution and courtroom par-
ticipation in addition to retributive justice .... [W] here [de-
fendants] rights clearly trump those of the victims, as at
Arusha and the Hague, the conception ofjustice embodied in
the trial is skewed toward process at the expense of the outcomes
. . . . There is surely something incomplete about interna-
tional war crimes trials in which the rights of the defendant
appear to be far more important than those of hundreds of
thousands of victims and survivors and become the sole yard-
stick for assessment of such trials.15 2
As long as Africans remain distrustful of, and feel alienated
from, the accountability mechanism, they are unlikely to support
efforts to address impunity through international criminal prose-
cution. Efforts must be made to involve citizens in the accounta-
bility process, especially victims who feel marginalized and frus-
trated by their inability to participate. 153 Without providing a fo-
such a trial concerns events that took place in recent memory, in a society
that's still highly divided and deeply traumatized, the trial itself too often exac-
erbates existing political rifts.
Helena Cobban, Think Again: International Courts, FOREIGN POL'Y, March 1, 2006.
150. See Hafner & King, supra note 99, at 104 ("In a trial system, the focus is on the
offenders-determining their guilt or innocence-while the victims are essentially
treated as tools in the prosecutors' case, confined in their testimony to only those frag-
ments of their experience that meet the legal standard of relevant evidence.").
151. For a general discussion of evidentiary standards applicable in international
criminal courts including ICTR, see Bert Swart, International Criminal Courts and the Ad-
missibility of Evidence, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL AccouNTABILI-.
THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN A WORLD OF STATES 135-53 (Ramesh Thakur & Oeter Mal-
content eds., 2004).
152. Moghalu, supra note 30, at 521-22 (emphasis in original).
153. See Kritz, supra note 27, at 59 (noting that the victim's group and local society
were long ignored by the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, and outreach to
the local population on their work took years to begin).
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rum for the victims and survivors of mass violence to tell their
stories, it will be difficult to build and sustain public trust that is
critical to efforts to address impunity in Africa.154 The answer to
the problem of non-involvement of victims in trials, according to
Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, "is not to consistently seek interna-
tional trials even when the circumstances call for alternative ap-
proach, but instead to utilize, wherever possible, local justice
that meets standards that can be objectively regarded as ade-
quate. " '55
E. Environmental Factors
1. Ethnic Tensions
The challenge of prosecuting perpetrators of evil in Africa is
complicated by decades of mutual distrust among the ethnic
groups that comprise the nation.1" 6 Deeply rooted distrust and
reciprocal hatred among the ethnic groups continues to sustain
the prevailing credo that emphasizes ethnic identity above loy-
alty to the nation. 157 Every government action is viewed through
the lens of ethnicity, thus making it difficult, if not impossible,
for citizens to fairly and objectively evaluate important issues like
economic policies and programs, political initiative, and even
the administration ofjustice. t 8 Depending on the background
of the defendants, international criminal prosecution is either
acclaimed as an effort to promote accountability or as an at-
tempt to silence a particular ethnic group by disabling their
leaders. 15 ' The objects of criminal prosecution lament their loss
154. See AMNESTY AFTER ATROCITY?, supra note 10, at 13 (stating that the viewpoint
of victims/survivors of atrocities is an extremely important one because they form a
sizeable proportion in any post-atrocity society, and if their needs are not adequately
met, there is no chance that those of the broader society can be met either).
155. Moghalu, supra note 30, at 522.
156. See generally DANIEL HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985).
157. Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design for Africa, 29
STAN.J. INr'L L. 1, 12 (1992) ("Ethnicity tends to be more important to Africans than it
is to individuals elsewhere. In much of Africa, ethnicity is the hub around which life
revolves.").
158. For a detailed analysis of the impact of ethnicity on the governance process in
Nigeria, see Okechukwu Oko, Partition or Perish: Restoring Social Equilibrium in Nigeria
Through Reconfiguration, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 317 (1998).
159. See Kingsley Moghalu, Reconciling Fractured Societies: An African Perspective on the
Role of Judicial Prosecutions, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTA-
BILITY THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN A WORLD OF STATES 197, 217-18 (Ramesh Thakur &
Peter Malcontent eds., 2004) (in fractured societies, which have come to that state as a
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of power and accuse prosecutors of doing the bidding of their
political opponents with the blessing or backing of the interna-
tional community.1 60 For example, the ICTR's alleged failure to
issue indictments against the Tutsis despite allegations of abuses
against the Tutsis lead many in Rwanda "to view the tribunal as
[a] vehicle to persecute ... Hutus, rather than promote a return
to impartial rule of law." 6 ' Claims of bias, even though unsub-
stantiated for the most part, have historical resonance because
most African countries are fractured societies marked by deep-
seated ethnic animosities. 162 Prosecuting authorities face an ava-
lanche of negative sentiments from citizens who either impute
improper motives or impugn their integrity. Jose Alvarez in his
disquisition on the ICTR stated that "the majority of the
thousands detained inside Rwanda's jail today report, and per-
haps genuinely feel, that 'they have done nothing wrong' and
are being victimized merely because they were on the 'wrong
side of the war.' "163 Criminal prosecutions conducted amidst ac-
cusations and counter-accusations of bias generate public dissat-
isfaction, fuel citizens' anger, and ultimately diminish the likeli-
hood of reconciliation.
2. Attitude Towards Litigation
Africans generally dislike litigation and typically go to court
as the last resort after exhausting every available means of con-
flict resolution. 64 Distaste for litigation is both cultural and ex-
periential. It is generally understood among the citizens that
good members of the community need not go to court to resolve
their differences; they typically work out their differences on
their own or with the support of the community's dispute resolu-
tion machinery. 165 The few cases that make it to trial leave bitter
result of the demagoguery of leading political figures, attempts will be made to deflect
efforts to exalt individual accountability with propaganda that seeks to undermine the
perception of the impartiality of justice).
160. See McMorran, supra note 67 (in cases of genocide, those accused of war
crimes are usually all from one ethnic group; to this group, a war crimes tribunal can
appear to be a trial against their ethnicity, not just an individual from their group).
161. Smith, supra note 62, at 16.
162. See infra notes 284-96 and accompanying text.
163. Alvarez, supra note 77, at 468.
164. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
165. See Vukor-Quarshie, supra note 111, at 104 (stating that for a majority of the
population "the antiquated informal procedures of conciliation and mediation are the
first recourse in situations of conflict").
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memories in the minds of the parties. Trials are adversarial and
parties, in an attempt to bolster their case, trade accusations that
reignite old hostilities. The exchange of unpleasantries in court
severs whatever is left of the bonds of friendship between the
parties, making it almost impossible for them to reestablish any
relationship.
Trials in the context of post-conflict present unique
problems and challenges for the parties and, more so, for the
international criminal tribunal that has as one of its mandates
the reconciliation of the parties.166 Parties who come from the
same community, or who are neighbors or old friends, find it
difficult to reestablish social harmony after a rancorous and pro-
tracted trial before a foreign tribunal. 67 Publicly trading accusa-
tions in court forecloses the prospects of reestablishing peaceful
relationships among the parties. As Jason Fink aptly observed in
the Rwandan context:
As a society which has just experienced the trauma of a social
genocide and as a society whose social geography dictates that
the surviving victim group must coexist with the aggressor
group, Rwanda has special social requirements which need to
be addressed in order to generate a framework for social rein-
tegration.' 6
8
A way out may be to resort to the traditional justice system,
which is less confrontational and more conducive for dealing
with conflicts in African societies.169 The disenchantment of Af-
rican leaders with the destabilizing effects of criminal prosecu-
tions probably informed the decision of Ugandan leaders to re-
quest the international criminal tribunal to halt the prosecution
166. See Hafner & King, supra note 99, at 104-05.
Where the violence of civil conflict was widespread, eventually partisans from
both sides are going to return to communities and often will have to live
alongside the people they once considered enemies. Even when a human
rights abuser has been punished by the court, this does not assure that in the
eyes of the community, justice has been done and all debts paid.
Id.
167. See Jackson N. Maogoto, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: A Pa-
per Umbrella in the Rain? Initial Pitfalls and Brighter Prospects, 73 Norwic J. INT'L L. 187,
205 (2004) ("In a deeply divided society, arguably the only type of society likely to pro-
duce the types of crimes for which the ICTR was established, criminal prosecutions do
not necessarily have a conciliatory effect. Rather, they manifest and exacerbate divi-
sion.").
168. Fink, supra note 43, at 124.
169. See supra notes 41-46.
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of members of the Lord's Army, a rebel group fighting with the
Ugandan government. t7 ° In urging a halt to criminal prosecu-
tions, the leaders stated "that their communities' traditional ap-
proach would be far more effective than international prosecu-
tions in ending the violence. '17 1
3. Lack of Cooperation from State Governments
International criminal tribunals need the cooperation of
state governments on a broad range of issues to effectively inves-
tigate and prosecute perpetrators of evil. 72 International crimi-
nal prosecutors depend importantly on access to the crime scene
to gather evidence and crucially on access to victims and wit-
nesses to determine exactly what happened and to ascertain
those responsible for the atrocities. 173 Also, international crimi-
nal prosecutors do not have enforcement mechanisms and,
therefore, need the cooperation of state governments, which can
generally assist in the arrest and extradition of defendants
within their borders. 174 Carla Del Ponte, former chief prosecu-
tor for the ICTR, in a statement remembered more for its lack of
170. See Cobban, supra note 149.
171. Id.
172. Annie Wartanian, Note, The ICC Prosecutor's Battlefield: Combating Atrocities
While Fighting for States' Cooperation-Lessons From the U.N. Tribunals Applied to the Case of
Uganda, 36 GEo. J. INT'L L. 1289, 1292 (2005) ("international tribunals dealing with
atrocity crimes lack their own enforcement mechanisms and, as a result, they must rely
first and foremost on the cooperation of the state where the crime occurred").
173. Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and
Prospects, 27 YALEJ. I NT'L L. 111, 119 (2002).
[I]nternational criminal courts are dependent on other organizations-the
states, most importantly-to give them things. These things-money, evi-
dence, access to evidence, defendants, witnesses, witness protection, court per-
sonnel, prison facilities, and the enforcement of orders and judgments-are
all necessary for the courts' success, and, indeed, without them, the courts
could not operate or exist.
Id.
174. See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 383, 408 (1998)
("The weakest link in all of the international law is the lack of effective enforcement
mechanisms."). The importance of cooperation from state governments was recog-
nized by the ICC Statute which in part 9 contains elaborate provisions relating to coop-
eration and assistance from state government. See ICC Statute, supra note 24, pt. 9. For
a detailed examination of the obligations of state governments to cooperate with the
ICC, see generally Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry & John McManus, How the World Will
Relate to the Court: The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Court, 25 FoRIt-
HAm1 -'L L.J. 767 (2002).
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tact and appeal to raw politics than its intrinsic eloquence, con-
ceded that state governments hold a great deal of leverage over
international criminal prosecutions. She stated, while arguing a
case before the appellate chamber of the ICTR, "whether we like
it or not, we must come to terms with the reality that our ability
to continue our investigations depends on Rwanda." t75 Antonio
Cassese, the first President of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Yugoslavia, underscored the Tribunal's dependence on
state governments more poignantly than Carla Del Ponte, stating
that "[o] ur tribunal is like a giant who has no arms and legs ....
To walk and work, he needs artificial limbs. These artificial
limbs are the state authorities." 176
African leaders are deeply concerned, perhaps consumed
by obsession, with retaining power. They therefore execrate the
idea of a foreign agency over which they have no control invad-
ing their domain. The relationship between the government
and the international criminal tribunal is dictated by calcula-
tions of self-interest. They are reluctant to cooperate with inter-
national prosecutors, especially if such cooperation carries po-
tential risks. Kingsley Moghalu, former spokesperson for the
ICTR, in a balanced and dispassionate account of the attitude of
African leaders toward the ICTR, stated:
African support for the Arusha tribunal has been far more
ambivalent, especially in the tribunal's early years .... Afri-
can leaders were initially unsure ofjust how to respond to the
idea of an intrusive international tribunal in the creation of
which they played little or no role. Some were suspicious,
some apprehensive, and the majority noncommittal, adopt-
ing a wait-and-see posture.177
African leaders, whose primal impulse is to cling onto
power, find themselves in a quandary. They understand that
criminal prosecutions, especially of high profile perpetrators,
will help reestablish the legitimacy of the government, deepen
respect for the rule of law, affect dynamics of group relations
and attract the respect and support from the international com-
munity. On the other hand, they are suspicious of anything that
175. RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, supra note 72, at 117.
176. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 213-14 (2004).
177. RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, supra note 72, at 163.
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will diminish their influence in the society. They are acutely
aware that supporting international prosecutions in a society
riven by distrust for the West and where citizens question the
bona fides of the central government carries enormous risks and
consequences. Concern that supporting international criminal
prosecutions would unleash popular dissatisfaction often affects
the calculations of African leaders. Support for criminal prose-
cutions might convey the wrong impression that the government
is "a powerless tool of the West,"1 78 or encourage the restive citi-
zenry to seek a regime change. Some citizens also accuse leaders
who support international prosecutions as playing the role of
quislings for cheap gains or advantage. Leaders only show com-
mitment to prosecution if it is in their self interest or if they are
sure that such prosecution poses no substantial threat to their
survival. They gauge the sentiments of their citizens and take
action or issue statements designed to placate public opinion.
In refusing to cooperate with ICC prosecutors, the Sudanese
government "painted the ICC investigation as a Western-inspired
plot to punish the regime and perhaps seek a regime change. "179
Another reason for the lack of cooperation is that most govern-
ments are either ethnic-based or tribally-inspired and thus ex-
hibit understandable reluctance to cooperate with international
prosecutors when the targets of indictment are either their kins-
men, loyalists or friends.18 ° Despite claims of nationhood, eth-
nic fervor runs deep in the psyche of Africans. 181 Leaders, most
of whom assumed office through the support of their ethnic
group, can ill afford to risk loss of support and possible aliena-
tion by authorizing the prosecution of their kinsmen. In Iraq,
for example, it is doubtful whether the trial and subsequent exe-
cution of Saddam Hussien would have been possible if the Sun-
nis controlled the government.1 82
178. Blumenson, supra note 42, at 826.
179. Nick Grono, Future of the World Court in Balance, YALEGLOBAL, Mar. 7, 2007,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=8875.
180. See Ochieng, supra note 47.
181. See John Rapley, The New Middle Ages, FoREIGN AFF., May-June 2006, at 102
("In many sub-Saharan African countries, for example, the postcolonial state never suc-
ceeded in implanting itself deeply in the day-to-day lives of its citizens, let alone their
consciousness. In such lands, the state's retreat has led to the reactivation of 'tradi-
tional' political actors such as ethnic communities and religious brotherhoods.").
182. For a collection of essays examining the establishment, operations and polit-
ics of the trial of Saddam Hussein, see generally MICHAEL P. ScHLARF & GREcORY S. Mc-
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Also, in some cases, some of the new leaders have connec-
tions with the ancien regime and cannot completely absolve
themselves from the atrocities of the former leaders.183 Either
due to timidity or corruption, new leaders are reluctant to sup-
port the prosecution of their benefactors. 18 4 Considerations of
self interest also affect the calculations of national leaders in de-
ciding whether or not to cooperate with international criminal
prosecutors.1 85 Some governments are nervous about the activi-
ties of international criminal prosecutors and are reluctant to
cooperate with them. African leaders deeply resent the involve-
ment of foreign agencies in what they consider to be their do-
minion. They truly believe that allowing international criminal
prosecutors unfettered access to their domain will diminish their
influence and authority, and ultimately lead to a lack of respect
by their citizens. Some African rulers are tyrants and dictators
masquerading as democrats.1 86 Even though they do not pub-
licly condemn the activities of international criminal prosecu-
tors, privately, they express disquiet about them.1 87 They fear
that if the trend represents the wave of the future, they too
someday, may become objects of international criminal prosecu-
tion.188 As Kingsley Moghalu put it:
There are few countries in sub-Saharan Africa where politi-
cally or ethnically inspired mass killings or war crimes have
NEAL, SADDAM ON TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL
(2006).
183. See Oko, supra note 16, at 98-99.
184. See id. at 117-23.
185. See Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 65, at 40 (reporting that "[t]he Rwandan
government, fearing indictment of its own leaders, has refused to cooperate with the
international tribunal and thereby convinced the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to
recommend the replacement of prosecutor Carla Del Ponte").
186. See generally 2006 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 5 (documenting human rights
abuses in various African countries).
187. Some people believe that calls for an African solution are motivated by selfish
interests. African governments have traditionally promoted the idea of noninterfer-
ence in a nation's internal affairs. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity art.
3, Sept. 13, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
188. International criminal prosecution represents a real threat to African leaders,
one which most of them genuinely fear. Describing the unwillingness of some West
African countries to cooperate in the arrest of former Liberian warlord Charles Taylor,
Eric Witte, co-director of the Democratization Policy Council, stated, "Obasanjo and
others in West Africa were so reluctant to see Taylor arrested because so many of these
leaders have skeletons in their closets. This was an old boys' network and they were
looking out for each other's interests while failing to look after their people's interests."
Robyn Dixon, Where Will Africa Trials Lead?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2006, at A20.
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not occurred in the past four decades. These events necessa-
rily implicate the responsibility of the political and military
leadership, past or present, in these countries. Consequently
there is little appetite for a normative approach that could
return to hunt its supporters.'
8 9
For whatever reason, African governments have not given
international criminal prosecutors the level of cooperation they
need to effectively discharge their obligations. A devastating ex-
ample of the lack of cooperation is the current stand-off between
the Sudanese Government and prosecutors of the International
Criminal Court. Soon after the United Nations' Security Coun-
cil voted to refer Darfur to the International Criminal Court,
President A1-Bashir defiantly declared, "I shall never hand any
Sudanese national to a foreign court."'9 ° The Sudanese govern-
ment subsequently threatened to "cut the throat of any interna-
tional official ... who tries to jail a Sudanese official in order to
present him to the international justice."191
The relationship between the Rwandan government and
the ICTR has hovered dubiously between unease and downright
contempt. The Rwandan government has often expressed its ex-
asperation with the activities of the ICTR, and has been less than
enthusiastic in helping the ICTR to deal with perpetrators of
evil. The government also openly castigated the former chief
prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, and endlessly complained to the
United Nations urging her removal.' 92 Apart from dislike for
the chief prosecutor, the Rwandan government fussed intermi-
nably over a broad range of issues, including the performance of
the tribunal resulting from poor organizational structure, 9 ' in-
competent tribunal personnel, and "the tribunal leadership that
shows a perceived 'hostility towards cooperation with the govern-
ment of Rwanda."" 94 Another source of tension between the
Rwandan government and the ICTR is the perception by the
Rwandan government that the "ICTR and western observers
value the rights of defendants over those of the victims." '95 The
189. RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, supra note 72, at 164.
190. Grono, supra note 179.
191. Id.
192. See Prosecutor Accused, ECONOMIsT, Aug. 23, 2003, at 38.
193. See Strain & Keyes, supra note 162, at 106.
194. Id.
195. Id. n.92.
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perception of the ICTR's insensitivity to the victims of genocide
is further heightened by the sentencing disparity between
Rwandan courts and the ICTR. Perpetrators tried by Rwandan
courts receive the death penalty while their more fortunate
counterparts who appear before the ICTR receive terms of im-
prisonment to be served in more comfortable prisons in Eu-
rope. 96 An official of the Rwandan Patriotic Front ("RPF") ex-
pressed the frustration widely shared by both the government
and citizens of Rwanda when he stated that "it does not fit our
definition of justice to think of the authors of the Rwandan ge-
nocide sitting in full-service Swedish prisons with a television. "197
It was widely reported that Rwandan President Paul Kigame
resented the chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, for attempting to
investigate crimes allegedly committed by the Tutsis during the
mayhem.' 98 The subtle resentment of the ICTR by the Rwandan
government telescoped into full blown defiance following the
dismissal of the indictment against Barayagwiza by the ICTR on
technical grounds. 99
The judgment confirmed the belief that was already perco-
lating in Rwanda that the ICTR was engaged in 'judicial conspir-
acy" against the government of Rwanda.2 0  The Rwandan gov-
ernment condemned the decision of the ICTR in very strong
196. Some European countries including Denmark, Norway and Belgium and
some African countries offered to provide their prisons for perpetrators convicted by
the ICTR. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, International Co-operation
With the Tribunal Fact Sheet No. 6, available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/fact
sheets/6.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2007).
197. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 255 (1998).
198. See Declan Walsh, Turning a Blind Eye to Increasingly Dictatorial Ways of Rwanda's
Leader, IRISH TIMES (Dublin), Aug. 27, 2003, at 14.
199. See Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR 72, Decision, (Nov. 3,
1999). An Appeal Chamber of the ICTR dismissed the indictment against Barayagwiza,
one of the principal architects of the genocide in Rwanda. The Appeal Chamber held
that his lengthy pre-trial detention amounted to a violation of his right to be tried
without delay. In March of 2000, however, a new panel of the Appeal Chamber re-
viewed and reversed its former decision and ordered that Brayagwiza should be tried
for the charges against him. See Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR 72,
Prosecutor's Request for Review and Reconsideration (March 31, 2001). The Appeal
Chamber found that Barayagwiza's rights had been violated, but ruled that the remedy
was not outright release, but a reduction in sentence. See id. For a detailed analysis of
the case and the politics surrounding it, see Jared Paul Marx, Intimidation of Defense
Witnesses at the International Criminal Tribunals: Commentary and Suggested Legal Remedies,
7 CHI. J. IrN'L L. 675 (2007).
200. See RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, supra note 72, at 108.
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terms. It announced that it was suspending cooperation with the
ICTR unless the decision was reversed.2 0 ' In addition to the tor-
rent of splenetic criticisms, the Rwandan government took some
measures to demonstrate its seriousness in ending relations with
the ICTR. The Rwandan government turned down the chief
prosecutor's routine and anodyne request for a visa to visit
Rwanda.20 It also refused to issue visas to witnesses summoned
to testify before the ICTR.2 °3 Reacting to the government's de-
nial of travel documents to witnesses, an obviously exasperated
ICTR presiding Judge Navanethem Pillay, stated that "[t]he
Rwandan government's failure to issue travel documents in a
timely manner to facilitate the appearance of witnesses before
the international tribunal has resulted in unavailability of wit-
nesses and consequently the postponement of three trials."20 4
The public and well-documented battle between the ICTR
and the government of Rwanda provides a devastating illustra-
tion of the treacherous terrain international criminal prosecu-
tors must navigate as they seek to promote accountability. Inter-
national criminal prosecutors must learn to deal cautiously with
state governments and leaders who have the ability and incentive
to scuttle efforts to promote accountability. They must also be
sensitive to the masses whose sensibilities have been lacerated by
what they consider an attempt by the international community
to re-colonize Africa.
The potential for promoting accountability through inter-
national criminal prosecutions is thwarted when state govern-
ments refuse to cooperate with international criminal prosecu-
tors. Lack of cooperation will frustrate the work of the tribunal
because state governments typically exert enormous influence
over their citizens. Witnesses, fearful of reprisal from state gov-
ernments, may become uncooperative or unavailable.205 Estab-
lishing guilt without the cooperation of witnesses will be very dif-
ficult and perhaps elusive. That is why the threat by the Suda-
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Marc Lacey, Tribunal Says Rwanda is Stalling Inquiry into 1994 Killings, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at A3.
204. Id.
205. Credible fears of retaliation against witnesses probably accounts for the estab-
lishment of witness protection programs by the ICTR_ See generally Goran Sluiter, The
ICTR and the Protection of Witnesses, 3 J. I-rr'L CIM. JusT. 962 (2005) (discussing various
witness protection programs instituted by the ICTR).
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nese government to derail prosecution should be taken
seriously. Successful open defiance of the international commu-
nity would embolden other countries, diminish the significance
of international criminal prosecutions, and may ultimately
thwart all hopes of promoting accountability in Africa through
criminal prosecutions. Nick Grono, Vice President of Interna-
tional Crisis Group, accurately framed the consequences of fail-
ing to address the threats raised by the Sudanese government:
Security Council inaction in the face of Sudanese defiance
would undermine the ICC, perhaps fatally, and expose the
council as a paper tiger . . . failure to ensure compliance
would encourage not just Sudan, but other governments
whose officials are targeted by the ICC, to defy the court ....
How the Security Council responds to Sudan's defiance will
go a long way to determining whether the ICC will meet its
founders' expectations that it "put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of [atrocity crimes] and thus to contribute to the
prevention of such crimes."206
4. Limits of Criminal Prosecutions
Almost everyone involved in the establishment of interna-
tional criminal tribunals, the United Nations Security Council,20 7
scholars, 208 and the tribunals 209 all cite the normal clich6s-de-
206. Grono, supra note 179 (alteration in original).
207. The preamble of the United Nations Security Council resolution that estab-
lished the ICTR stated, inter alia, that "prosecutions of persons responsible for the
above mentioned violations of international humanitarian law will contribute to ensur-
ing that such violations are halted and effectively redressed." See ICTR Statute, supra
note 22, pmbl.
208. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 409, 410 (2000) ("The pursuit ofjustice and accountability, it is believed,
fulfills fundamental human values, helps achieve peace and reconciliation, and contrib-
utes to the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts."); see also David Scheffer, War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 11 PACE Irrr'L L. REv. 319, 328 (1999) ("As instru-
ments of deterrence, the tribunals are formidable partners that cannot be lightly ig-
nored in the future.").
209. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Raganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3 (Dec. 6, 1999). Stressing
the relevance of deterrence, the ICTR stated that:
[T]he penalties imposed on accused persons found guilty by the Tribunal
must be directed . . . at deterrence, namely to dissuade forever, others who
may be tempted in the future to perpetrate such atrocities by showing them
that the international community shall not tolerate the serious violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights.
Id. Also, Richard Goldstone, the former Chief Prosecutor at the ICTY, emphasizes de-
terrence as one of the main values of international criminal prosecutions. He states:
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210terrence, incapacitation, the need to consolidate democracy
and deepen the rule of law211_ to justify international criminal
prosecutions.212 The deterrent value of punishment proceeds
on the assumption that by punishing perpetrators of evil, other
citizens will be discouraged from engaging in similar conduct.2 13
It is hoped that punishment will deter the defendant by "giving
him an unpleasant experience he will not want to endure
again. " 211 Imposing costs on prohibited conduct will discourage
citizens from engaging in criminal behavior.
Retribution satisfies society's need for sanctions against er-
rant behavior. Punishing wrongdoers prevents recourse to
self-help or vigilantism by victims of crime.216 Martha Minow ele-
gantly stated one of the chief values of criminal prosecution, "it
[I]f people in leadership positions know that there's an international court
out there, that there's an international prosecutor, and that the international
community is going to act as an international police force, I just cannot be-
lieve that they aren't going to think twice as to the consequences. Until now,
they haven't had to. There has been no enforcement mechanism at all.
Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the First International
War Crimes Tribunal Since Nuremburg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 868 (1997).
210. See, e.g., Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542 (1991); see also Payam Akhan,
Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on United Nations War
Crimes Tribunal, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 739, 743-51 (1998).
211. See generally, CAP-LOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996).
"[R] etroactive justice for massive human rights violations helps protect democratic val-
ues. An aggressive use of the criminal laws will counteract a tendency towards unlawful-
ness, negate the impression that some groups are above the law, and consolidate the
rule of law." Id. at x.
212. See Aukerman, supra note 60, at 44 (noting that in the context of domestic
and international crime, theoretical frameworks justifying punishment of offenders in-
clude desert/retribution/vengeance, and deterrence).
213. See Zolo, supra note 69, at 733 (the memory of past pains should advise the
convict against reiterating his criminal behavior, whereas the social spectacle of the
misery imposed upon deviant individuals should lead most citizens to respect those
collective rules that the group freely adopted).
214. LAFAVE, supra note 32, at 27.
215. See MINOW, supra note 27, at 12 (arguing that retribution "motivates punish-
ment out of fairness to those who have been wronged and reflects a belief that wrong-
doers serve blame and punishment in direct proportion to the harm inflicted").
216. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart J., concurring)
(stating that when people "begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable
to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown
the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law"); see also Akhavan,
supra note 31, at 23 (detention and trial of tens of thousands of genocidaires before
Rwandese courts may be viewed as an alternative to mass expulsions or widespread ex-
trajudicial executions and private revenge killings).
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transfers the individuals' desires for revenge to the state or offi-
cial bodies. The transfer cools vengeance into retribution, slows
judgment with procedure, and interrupts with documents, cross-
examination, and the presumption of innocence, the vicious cy-
cle of blame and feud. 2 1 7
Isolating the criminal from the rest of the society, otherwise
known as incapacitation, disables the perpetrator from doing
further harm to the society.218 Incapacitating the offender also
protects the society from those considered by their criminal an-
tecedent to be dangerous.21 9 In the context of mass violence,
indicted leaders either in custody or running from justice lose
standing before their supporters and thus are ultimately unable
to engineer violence.220  Arrest, or even mere indictment of
genocidal leaders, deflates the aura of invincibility enjoyed by
warlords, limits their capacity to plot more evil, and reassures the
restive public that no one is beyond the reach of the law.22 1 As
was admirably put by Justice Hassan Jallow, the chief prosecutor
for the ICTR, "public exposure of the criminality of leaders, be
they military or civil, through evidence adduced at trial not only
brings to account those arrested and prosecuted, but incapaci-
tates those on the run from the law, thereby excluding extremist
217. MINOW, supra note 27, at 26 (1986); see also Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty
and International Law, 18 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 983 (2006) (stating that by channel-
ing accountability and punishment through an official mechanism, society hopes to
avoid individual vigilantism and to provide an impartial forum where the individuals
accused of crimes during a prior regime may have their cases heard, with all the due
process rights necessary to ensure that their treatment is not tantamount to a vendetta
or purge).
218. See Greenawalt, supra note 89, at 601-02 ("Incarceration may remove evil po-
litical actors from power, and those who remain at large may go into hiding from where
they have less influence, or they may otherwise temper their behavior.").
219. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 32, at 24.
220. See Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interest of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions
and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 481, 489 (2003) (arguing that a
criminal prosecution "tends to expose the extremists for what they are-criminals,
thereby stigmatizing them, diminishing their influence and removing them from power
and society").
221. See Stromseth, supra note 69, at 262.
[B]y removing perpetrators of atrocities from positions in which they can con-
trol and abuse others, criminal trials... can have a cathartic impact by assur-
ing the population that old patterns of impunity and exploitation are no
longer tolerated. Barring known perpetrators from committing new atrocities
and delegitimizing them in the eyes of the public helps to break patterns of
rule by fear and build public confidence that justice can be fair.
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tendencies from the national transitional process. "222
Punishment also serves educative functions both for the per-
petrator and the larger society. Punishment conveys to both the
defendant and other citizens the society's revulsion of criminal
behavior.223 The guilty typically suffer obloquy and are held up
to the society as unsavory examples of unacceptable conduct. It
is therefore hoped that punishment and accompanying obloquy
will redirect behavior or blunt impulses that lead to criminal be-
havior. Punishment sends a strong message to the citizens that
illegal action attracts consequences and "demonstrates to citi-
zens that there are ways of coping with differences other than
resorting to violence. "224
Central to the notion of criminal trials is the assumption
that individuals whose conduct the law seeks to prohibit are ca-
pable of rational thinking.225 By simply engaging in cost-benefit
analysis, citizens will refrain from committing crimes if the cost
of illegal behavior far exceeds its value.2 2 6 Punishing criminal
conduct is appropriate because the individual punished is con-
sidered a free moral agent who knew or had reason to know that
his conduct was illegal, and could have refrained from engaging
in the conduct if he so desired, but nevertheless chose to violate
the law. This assumption explains the existence of defenses like
insanity, intoxication, and compulsion in criminal jurispru-
dence.227
The assumptions that undergird criminal trials seem to be
of doubtful utility in a continent with dramatically different cul-
tural and social assumptions and in the context of mass vio-
222. Justice Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, ICTR, Speech to the University of
Lund in Stora Salen: Justice After Genocide: The Challenges of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 9 Uan. 31, 2007).
223. See Laurel Fletcher, From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International
Criminal Justice, 26 MICH.J. INT'L L. 1013, 1028-29 (2005) ("International criminal trials
are powerful symbols that convey moral, social, as well as legal approbation of the guilty
and the political objectives that drive them to commit their misdeeds.").
224. See Andrew Rigby, Dealing With the Past: Forgiveness and the Reconstruction of
Memory in Divided Societies, 3 INT'LJ. POL. & ETHICS 93 (2003).
225. SeeJOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 131 (1989) ("Pun-
ishment presumes human beings to be rational actors who weigh the benefits of non-
compliance against the probability and costs of punishment."); see generally Johannes
Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. Rv. 949, 960 (1966).
226. See Andenaes, supra note 225, at 949 (stating that because of the hazards in-
volved, a person who contemplates a punishable offense might not act).
227. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 32.
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lence.228 The causes of violence in Africa are considerably differ-
ent from what leads to deviant behavior in developed societies.
Causes of and motivations for crimes of mass violence reside in
structural deficiencies in the society, not in the personalities
trapped within the system. The assumptions of criminal prose-
cution discount or fail to adequately recognize the idiosyncratic
environmental factors that animate citizens to engage in vio-
lence. Violence in Africa is often environment-driven and takes
place when conditions are right. The environment and prevail-
ing culture create violent behavior in two ways. First, state fail-
ures and the resulting power vacuum present optimal anarchic
environments for violence. Once the state collapses, violence
becomes an attractive option for all the parties concerned. Offi-
cials of the failing government, maneuvering to retain control,
use violence to consolidate their grip on power and demand alle-
giance from disaffected citizens.229 Political elites resort to vio-
lence to press for greater participation in the government and in
some cases to finagle their way to power.230 Ethnic groups use
violence to invite attention to their plight, to demand a more
equitable distribution of the nation's resources, and to attain
other strategic objectives.2 3 t Warlords and ethnic leaders manip-
ulate these environmental factors to transform otherwise law
abiding citizens into mindless zealots who have no qualms in-
flicting violence on their fellow human beings.2 32
228. See Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1221, 1254-55 (2000) (questioning the deterrent value of the
ICTY and the ICTR for crimes against humanity); see alsoJose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure:
Lessons of the TadicJudgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2079-80 (questioning the effective-
ness of deterrence in cases of mass violence).
229. See Preben Kaarsholm, State Failure, Societies in Collapse? Understanding of Violent
Conflict in Africa, in VIOLENCE, POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 1-2
(2006) (giving account of how political office holders in various African countries use
violence to retain power).
230. See Omar McDoom, Rwanda's Ordinary Killers: Interpreting Popular Partici-
pation in Rwanda Genocide 10-11 (Development Studies Institute, Working Paper No.
77, 2005), available at http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wp77.pdf (describing
how political elites used violence to wrest power from local officials in two communities
in Southern Rwanda).
231. See PAUL RICHARDS, FIGHTING FOR THE RAIN FOREST: wAR, YOUTH AND RE-
SOURCES IN SIERRA LEONE XX (1996) (noting that hand cutting, throat slitting and other
acts of terror in Sierra Leone became rational ways of achieving intended strategic out-
comes).
232. See generally JAMES WALLER, BECOMING EVIL: How ORDINARY PEOPLE COMMIT
GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLING (2002) (explaining why and how ordinary citizens partici-
pate in genocide); see also DANIEL CHIROT & CLARK MCCAULEY, WHY NOT KILL THEM
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Second, criminal trials are especially ineffective in an envi-
ronment where "criminal conduct that is normally characterized
as 'deviance' is transformed into acceptable, even desirable be-
havior."23 3 Mass violence in Africa thrives on and is driven by
prevailing orthodoxy that aggrandizes violence. Environmental
factors, especially the culture that celebrates violence, provide
motivations for criminal violent conduct. Crime in developed
societies is generally attributable to character flaws or misdi-
rected inclination of the perpetrator to gain a private advan-
tage.234 Violence in Africa and perpetrators of mass violence, on
the other hand, are motivated by cultural factors, especially the
desire to address ethnic group grievance.235 Perpetrators of
mass violence or genocide are often different from typical de-
fendants in settled societies. Violence, especially mass murders
and genocide, the kinds experienced in Rwanda, is not commit-
ted by ordinary criminals who kill because of individual weak-
nesses or deficiencies. Rather, it is committed by citizens who
accept and absorb the poisoned culture of hatred against other
ethnic groups. The values, attitudes and practices that promote
compliance with the law are dethroned and overwhelmed by the
culture that aggrandizes violence. Citizens raised in a culture
that celebrates violence participate in mass violence because
they believe killing members of another ethnic group was the
right thing to do. Professor Mark Drumbl offers an illuminating
perspective on the motives for mass violence by genocidal killers
in Africa:
Genocidal killers are not like common criminals. Staffing the
crematoria at Auschwitz was ajob paid by the state. This does
not make the work any less wicked, but distinguishes it from
ordinary crime. Similarly, I have interviewed detainees in the
Rwandan genocide prisons. Most of them thought they were
ALL? THE LOGIC AND PREVENTION OF MASS MURDER 11-50 (2006) (examining four main
motives that lead to mass murder, namely convenience, revenge, simple fear, and fear
of pollution).
233. The Promises of International Prosecution, supra note 64, at 1964.
234. See MARK J. OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, ORDINARY EVIL AND HANNAH ARENDT:
CRIMINAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR 32 (2001) (stating that ordinary
crime generally stems from ordinary vices: strong envy, avarice, hatred, vengeance,jeal-
ousy, ambition, pride, and distrust).
235. See BENJAMIN A. VALENTINO, FINAL SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND GENOCIDE IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 69 (2004) ("my research . . . also suggests that perpetrators
may view mass killing as a rational way to counter threats or implement certain types of
ideology").
INT'L CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN AFRICA
doing good by eliminating the enemy, including unarmed ci-
vilians and defenseless children. They were following orders
of a criminal state. The state told them to butcher and hack.
They believed in the state, so they butchered and hacked.
They perversely thought they were fulfilling a civic duty. 236
Professor Andenaes, in an oft-cited article, identified three
conditions that prevent an individual from engaging in criminal
conduct: "his moral inhibition, his fear of censure of his associ-
ates, and his fear of punishment. "237 Professor Andenaes' analy-
sis assumes that individuals who contemplate engaging in crimi-
nal behavior are capable of thinking rationally and operate in a
society where crime carries a social stigma.238 It also assumes that
the society is stable, orderly and has a history of swiftly and effec-
tively responding to criminal conduct. Professor Andenaes also
predicates his analysis on the belief that condemnation from
peers affects the calculations of citizens and helps them muster
the self restraint necessary to avoid engaging in criminal con-
duct.
23 19
These assumptions do not accord with the realities of con-
temporary Africa. Crazed warlords irredeemably committed to
nihilistic violence operate within a different normative realm.
They are convinced in the rightness of their conduct, and are
immune to the factors that typically generate and sustain the im-
pulse to refrain from criminal conduct. Violence rarely carries
social disapproval or even disgrace in most parts of Africa. It
has, instead, been celebrated, and carries a lot of cachet, espe-
cially when used in pursuit or defense of ethnic interests. 240 The
reality is that given the prevailing cultural orthodoxy that en-
dorses violence against an opposing ethnic group as a moral or
civic duty, it is doubtful if the conditions listed by Professor
Andenaes can constrain conduct. 241 As Professor Drumbl so elo-
quently states, "[w]hen eliminating the enemy becomes a civic
duty, the threat of prosecution by a distant international crimi-
236. Drumbl, supra note 33.
237. Andenaes, supra note 225, at 961.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See infra notes 287-96 and accompanying text.
241. For a discussion of genocide as a civic duty, see ALISON DEs FORGES, LEAvE
NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 515 (1999).
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nal court offers little in the way of deterrence. 24 2
Fear of punishment is the last thing on the minds of citizens
consumed by violence and eager to unleash it on their perceived
enemies.243 Leaders exhibit a narcissistic sense of invincibility
that blunts fears of detection and possible prosecution. Their
acolytes and foot soldiers are often less inclined to think about
the consequences of their actions. Most of them are poor, illiter-
ate, and have nothing significant to lose.244 Some are self-con-
ceited middle-aged men yawning for adulation of their ethnic
group. A disproportionate percentage of perpetrators of mass
violence are unemployed youths with no marketable skills who
view mass violence as an outlet to identify with warlords in the
hopes of eking out a living. Others are young children,
dragooned or bewitched with the ideology of hatred into joining
the genocidal group.241 Unemployment, illiteracy, feeling of
hopelessness, and craving for acceptance combine powerfully to
desensitize and numb perpetrators of mass violence to the moral
or legal implications of their conduct. 246 Citizens, especially chil-
dren under the influence of overweening warlords turn out to
be mindless robots willing and eager to do whatever is asked of
them. As Crawford Young states, "drugged, terrorized, and
promised supernatural protection, the child soldier could be a
242. See Drumbl supra, note 33; see also GOUREVITCH, supra note 197, at 123 (stating
that during genocide, the work of the killers was not regarded as a crime in Rwanda; it
was effectively the law of the land).
243. See generally Akhavan, supra note 31, at 9 (noting that "the threat of punish-
ment-let alone an empty threat-has a limited impact on human behavior in a culture
already intoxicated with hatred and violence").
244. A profile of fighters provided by psychologists who interviewed fighters in-
volved in the mayhem in Liberia is fairly representative of perpetrators of mass violence
in Africa: "He is someone usually between 16 and 35 years of age, who may have de-
cided to become a combatant for several reasons: to get food for survival, to stop other
fighters from killing his family and friends, was forced to become a combatant or be
killed, sheer adventurism etc." STEPHEN ELLIS, THE MASK OF ANARCHY: THE DESTRUC-
TION OF LIBERIA AND THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF AN AFRICAN CIVIL WAR 127 (1999).
245. See Crawford Young, The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on
Changing African PoliticalDynamics, 103 AFR. AFF. 23, 45-46 (2004) (stating that children
were often recruited by abduction; other youngsters in a social environment of hope-
lessnessjoined voluntarily); see also Human Rights Watch, Early to War: Child Soldiers in
the Chad Conflict, Vol. 19, No. 9(A), July 2007, available at http://hrw.org/reports/
2007/chadO7O7/ (discussing the involvement of child soldiers in the Chadian conflict).
246. See Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking LocalJustice as Transi-
tional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REv 1, 31 (2006) (noting that individuals commit ethnic vio-
lence for many factors . . . "dehumanization, fear, material greed, group conformity,
political opportunism, or more likely, some toxic combination thereof").
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fearless warrior. "247 Goaded by warlords or an ethnically in-
spired government, youngsters facing intense situational pres-
sures to identify with their communities scarcely think about the
consequences of their actions.248  Leaders consumed by the
quest for power and acceptance by their communities and citi-
zens engaged in mindless group-think are often unaffected by
the chastening influence of criminal law on human behavior.249
Citizens involved in collective activities tend to lose their au-
tonomy, and in the context of mass violence, submit to, and are
ruled by, the base instincts of the rabble.25 ° Citizens lost in the
crowd and exhilarated by the sense of invulnerability typically
forfeit the capacity to think for themselves and far too often are
unaffected by the risks associated with their actions. Rather, as
observed by famed scholars, "the group processes shift its mem-
bers toward taking more risky actions, and deindividuates them,
facilitating the commission of destructive behaviours. 251' They
also have no moral inhibitions and are often untroubled by the
censure of fellow citizens, most of whom are either involved in
or indifferent to the grotesque display of violence against their
perceived enemies.252
247. Young, supra note 245, at 45.
248. See generally The Promises of International Prosecution, supra note 64, at 1964 n.40
(noting "[m]oreover, even when the wrongful nature of the criminal action is clear,
norms of group conformity may be sufficiently powerful to render any deterrent value
immaterial").
249. See Drumbl, supra note 228, at 1254 (stating that "[s]ocieties engulfed by mass
political violence are not particularly conducive to rational behavior or fears of eventual
apprehension").
250. The ability of crowds to affect individual behavior is well-documented. The
famed French sociologist Gustav Le Bon stated:
Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an
agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from those
of the individuals composing it .... Whoever be the individuals that compose
it, however like or unlike be their mode of life, their occupations, their charac-
ter, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a
crowd puts them in possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them
feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each indi-
vidual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation.
GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND 23-27 (1969).
251. Paul Robinson & John Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 173, 181 (2004).
252. See OSIEL, supra note 234, at 60 (the social practice of retributive punishment
is based in the public's reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation toward the
defendant for his wrongful acts. These reactive attitudes are absent, however, when the
population largely supports, or is indifferent to these acts).
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Moreover, the comfort of the crowd and the reassurances of
warlords generate feelings of invulnerability. Citizens engaged
in mindless group-think typically harbor "illusions of invulnera-
bility,"25 3 which lead them "to ignore obvious danger, take ex-
treme risks, and be overly optimistic." 254 They have little or no
room for independent thought and often are uninclined to seize
the opportunity to think for themselves. Even those who appre-
ciate the illegality of their conduct genuinely believe that the
benefits of continued participation in mass orgy far exceed the
costs. In such an environment, the law's influence is dramati-
cally diminished as citizens pursue ethnic hatred unfazed by the
threat of criminal prosecution.2 5 5 Respect for the law is severely
diminished in an environment where warlords and ethnic chief-
tains bewitch vulnerable citizens with the ideology of hatred and
assure them that their conduct is consequence free.2 56 Once cit-
izens subscribe to the cultural ethos that aggrandizes violence as
a legitimate means to advance ethnic interest, the criminal pro-
cess becomes a poor vehicle for engineering compliance with
the law.25 7 Mass violence, aptly described by C.S. Santiago Nino
as "radical evil," 258 is typically not possible "unless carried out
with a high degree of conviction on the part of those who partici-
253. Kelley Tiffany, Cheering Speech at State University Athletic Events: How Do You
Regulate Bad Spectator Sportsmanship, 14 SPORTS L. J. 111, 122 (2007) (citing I.L. JANIS &
L. MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT AND COMMITMENT
(1997)).
254. Id.
255. See Daly supra note 48, at 106. Professor Daly states two main reasons why
criminal trial is unlikely to serve as a deterrent in transitional societies:
First, criminal trials do not address the causes of the wrong; because they treat
the wrong as aberrational, the primary concern is to remove it from society,
not to understand it. But where the wrong is woven into the fabric of society,
as in the case of mass atrocities, its etiology must be understood and treated.
Second, trials only address the leaders of the prior regime. If society permit-
ted or promoted the atrocity and violence and prejudice permeated the cul-
ture, then prosecuting only the leaders does not deter society generally.
Id.
256. See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 287 (1968)
("[R]espect for law generally is likely to suffer if it is widely known that certain kinds of
conduct, although nominally criminal, can be practiced with relative impunity.").
257. See Maogoto, supra note 167 (arguing that what motivated significant num-
bers of Rwandans to participate in the genocide "was not coercion, but rather genuine
support of the idea that the Tutsi had to be eliminated, together with the pursuit of
solidarity with others in attaining this goal").
258. NINO, supra note 211, at vii.
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pated in it. "259
Second, criminal trials designed to deal with individual guilt
are scarcely the appropriate vehicle for addressing violence in-
volving several hundreds and even thousands of perpetrators.26 °
The distinct and inexorable inclination of a criminal trial is to
impose sanctions on an identified individual for violating the
law. 26 1 A criminal trial designed to deal with individual responsi-
bility is often overwhelmed and ultimately rendered inadequate
to handle crimes committed by massive numbers of citizens.2 6 2
Genocide or crimes of mass violence, by definition, cannot be
carried out by an individual or even a few individuals.26 Rather,
genocide is typically possible if vast numbers of citizens partici-
pate or are complicit.2 64 In Rwanda, for example, a fairly accu-
259. Id. at ix.
260. See William Schabas, Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda:
Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L. F. 523 (1996) (it should be kept in
mind that no judicial system anywhere in the world has been designed to cope with the
requirements of prosecuting genocide. Criminaljustice systems exist to deal with crime
on an individual level. They are unsuited for crimes committed by tens of thousands,
and directed against hundreds of thousands); see also Amstutz, supra note 49, at 553
(discussing the limitations of the ICTR, the author states that "the major shortcoming
of the ICTR is not inefficiency but the inadequacy of the criminal justice system itself in
dealing with society-wide atrocities").
261. See LARRY MAY, CRIMEs AGAINST HumANrrY 237 (2005) ("Trials are best at deal-
ing with individuals who are responsible, not with groups that are responsible, espe-
cially large groups.").
262. See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Re-
thinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 579 (2002)
("[T] he sheer numbers of those who engaged in criminal acts overwhelms the capacity
of domestic and international justice systems."). The authors argue that:
The focus of trials on the individuals responsible for ordering or carrying out
acts of mass violence leaves three categories of persons and groups largely
untouched: (1) unindicted perpetrators including community members who
directly or indirectly profited from the event; (2) states outside the area of
conflict that may have contributed to the outbreak of violence by their acts or
omissions; and (3) the bystanders who did not actively participate in violence,
but who also did not actively intervene to stop the horrors.
Id.
263. According to Article 2 of the ICTR Statute, genocide is:
(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group or; (e) Forci-
bly transferring children of the group to another group . . . [if the act is]
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.
ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 2.
264. See MAY, supra note 261, at 157 ("[Glenocides rely on widespread cooperation
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rate survey put the number of citizens who participated in the
genocide at between 175,000 to 210,000.265
The machinery of justice that functions optimally in settled
societies exhibits visible signs of inadequacy or perhaps unsuita-
bility in societies sliding towards anarchy and girdled by mass
violence, genocide and corruption.2 6 6 Genocide, for example,
typically involves many perpetrators who bear varying levels of
culpability267 and participate in the mayhem for different rea-
sons.268 Some planned and orchestrated the violence, others
aided, abetted, and exhorted citizens to engage in violence.2 6 9
Some were unwilling participants, forced into action by over-
bearing warlords and government officials.27° Others partici-
pated to avoid the wrath of their kinsmen. Others stood idly by
and complicity by many, if not most, members of a given society. Indeed, genocides are
so pervasive that sometimes nearly all members of the society in some way participate,
or would have participated").
265. Scott Straus, How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An Esti-
mate, 6J. GENOCIDE RES. 85, 93-94 (2004).
266. See Helena Cobban, The Legacies of Collective Violence, BOSTON REv. Apr.-May
2002, available at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR27.2/cobban.html. Helena Cobban,
an international journalist with experience in Rwanda, raises questions about the un-
suitability of Western notions of justice in Rwanda. She stated:
The Rwandan genocide throws into profound relief many of the cosmological
and ethical assumptions-about the nature of individual responsibility, the
purpose of punishment, and the normal conditions of human life-upon
which our contemporary criminal court is based. We in the West seldom ex-
amine these assumptions. But the Rwandan case challenges them deeply and
calls on us to tread lightly and carefully before we spread the mantle (or
straightjacket) of our criminal justice system over populations or situations to
which it may be fundamentally unsuited.
Id.
267. See generally Allison M. Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal
Law, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75 (2005) (providing an excellent analysis of the different theories
of liability for the various participants in mass violence).
268. See VALENTINO, supra note 235, at 37 (listing patriotic duty, material or career-
ist ambition, fear or coercion as some of the reasons why individual citizens may partici-
pate in mass atrocities).
269. See id. ("[Miore significant segments of the public frequently lend their assis-
tance to mass killing in ways that do not involve direct participation in violence. Indi-
rect cooperation may involve activities such as producing weapons, providing logistical
and administrative support to organizations directly involved in the killing, or inform-
ing on fellow citizens.").
270. See Waldorf, supra note 246, at 33 ("Officials and soldiers placed substantial
pressure on people to demonstrate at least nominal support for the killing. Hutu who
rejected the propaganda about Tutsi and who chose not to participate in the genocide
were subjected to reproach on the radio and in public meetings, humiliation, fines,
imprisonment and even death.") (quoting Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Le-
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and failed to prevent the violence. Some were children between
the ages of nine and thirteen recruited or dragooned into join-
ing the mayhem by warlords.271 Criminal prosecution designed
essentially to handle individual liability exhibits visible signs of
inadequacy where vast segments of the society participate in the
violence. 27 2 As Maya Golden-Bolocan, a human rights officer,
stated:
Because of their focus on the individual responsibility of vol-
untary perpetrators, criminal prosecutions may be ill-suited to
deal with gross human rights abuses committed by mass seg-
ments of the population. In such cases, in fact, often individ-
uals act collectively with varying degrees of responsibility and
under varying degrees of coercion, which makes it difficult to
apply ordinary principles of criminal law. The focus on se-
lected individuals cannot account for the structural, inner
causes of the violence or uncover the complex connections
existing between people that made the massacres possible.
273
Some of the citizens neither chose nor planned to commit
genocide; it was hoisted on them.27 4 They also lacked the capac-
ity to resist or withstand the genocidal commands of warlords
gal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in My NEIGHBOR, My ENEMY. JUSTICE AND COMMU-
Nrr IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 49, 51 (2004)).
271. The phenomenon of child-soldiers has become a very serious problem in Af-
rica. Child-soldiers were used pervasively in the conflicts in Liberia and Uganda. See
generally Naomi Cahn, Poor Children: Child "Witches" and Child Soldiers in Sub-Saharan
Africa, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 413 (2006); NsonguruaJ. Udombana, War is not Child's
Play! International Law and the Prohibition of Children's Involvement in Armed Conflicts, 20
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 57 (2006).
272. See Daly, supra note 48, at 105. Discussing the difficulties of using criminal
trials to deal with society-wide abuses, Professor Daly states that:
Many of these derive from criminal prosecution's focus on individuals and on
the ideology of the individual responsibility of voluntary perpetrators. But this
approach may not fit situations where mass segments of society are responsible
for the deprivation of human rights: individuals act collectively, with varying
degrees of responsibility and under varying degrees of coercion. Responsibil-
ity in these situations is both more widespread and more resistant to the gen-
eralities that define non-traditional criminal law.
Id.
273. Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 82, at 360-61 (footnotes and internal quota-
tions omitted).
274. See ScoTr A. STRAUS, THE ORDER OF GENOCIDE: RACE, POWER AND WAR IN
RWANDA 5.32 (2006). In a survey of some low-level convicted, confessed participants in
the genocide, the author found that "intra-ethnic coercion (among Hutus) appears to
have been a ... greater determinant of genocidal participation than was inter-ethnic
enmity". Id.
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with dreadful records of brutality.27 5 An attempt at resisting
would have elicited immediate bodily harm, even death to them
and their families.2 76 In a sense, some of these perpetrators are
victims exposed to the evil machinations of warlords by the in-
ability of the state to provide them the protections available to
citizens in settled societies. For some, participating in the vio-
lence was a form of self preservation. They joined the violence
to avoid the recrimination of brutal warlords and the wrath of
their ethnic group. Faced with specific, undisguised and over-
whelming threats, they committed what John Kekes describes as
"unchosen evil." 27 7 This kind of evil occurs "when human agents
cause undeserved harm without being able to do otherwise. '"278
Citizens in the throes of intense, macabre violence and operat-
ing in an environment inhospitable to rational and independent
thinking had little or no choice in deciding whether or not to
join in the mayhem. The facts indicate that some were innocent
citizens bludgeoned into becoming accomplices by warlords. To
attribute to them the capacity to exercise independentjudgment
and treat them as perpetrators not only does grave violence to
logic and common sense but also results in injustice.279
Besides the unfairness of treating all the participants as
criminals, sorting out the guilty from the innocent amidst chaos
often proves to be "politically destabilizing, socially divisive, and
logistically and economically untenable. '2 0 The United Nations
apparently acknowledged the eminently difficult task of sorting
out the victims from low-level perpetrators of evil when it con-
fined the jurisdiction of the Sierra Leone tribunal to those "who
bear the greatest responsibility for [the commission of the
crimes] .281
275. See id., at 5.28-.41 (discussing how low-level perpetrators were compelled to
participate in the genocide).
276. See VALENnNO, supra note 235, at 32 (since active opposition to mass killing
can mean prosecution or death, most citizens manage to look the other way, even when
the victims are neighbors, friends, or relatives).
277. JOHN KEKES, FACING EVIL 66 (1990).
278. Id.
279. See Helena Cobban, When War-Crimes Prosecutions are Counter Productive, CHRIS-
TIAN ScI. MONITOR, May 12, 2005 ("[M]any-perhaps most-of the people around the
world who have actually lived through periods of mass violence say that under such
circumstances it is virtually impossible to make the kinds of clear distinctions between
perpetrators' and 'victims' that a criminal-court system relies on.").
280. Kritz, supra note 133, at 138.
281. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
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The third reason why criminal prosecution is ineffective in
stopping violence is the resurgence of ethnicity.28 2 Claims of na-
tionhood have never really blunted ethnic impulses that animate
and ultimately sunder existing poiitical arrangements and insti-
tutions in Africa.283 Africans have repeatedly proven themselves
incapable of breaking the blinders of ethnicity.284 It is part of
their mental make-up. Violence that has disfigured Africa often
results from tensions at the armature of the society: ethnic ir-
ridentism.285 New generations of Africans have internalized eth-
nic hatred and eagerly embraced violent criminal conduct di-
rected at opposing ethnic groups as proper etiquette and a legiti-
mate means either to press for greater respect or to ward off
marginalization by the central government.286 Violence, even
the most atrocious-murder and mayhem-is celebrated and re-
warded when it is directed against rival ethnic groups.28 7 Some
political elites, unable to attain power through constitutional
282. See generally BRUCE BERMAN, DICKSON EYOH & WILL KYMLICKA, ETHNICITY AND
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (2004) (providing an interesting collection of essays examining
the impact of ethnicity on the political process in various African countries).
283. In a way, the value and relevance of ethnic identity have accreted chiefly due
to failed efforts to implement constitutional democracy. Political elites readily attribute
electoral failures to marginalization by the dominant ethnic group. These claims reso-
nate within the masses and tend to reignite hostilities and resentment toward other
ethnic groups. For an interesting study of the impact of ethnicity on the search for
social order in Africa, see id.
284. See generally Selassie, supra note 157, at 12 ("Ethnicity tends to be more impor-
tant to Africans than it is to individuals elsewhere. In much of Africa, ethnicity is the
hub around which life revolves.").
285. See Akhavan, supra note 31, at 7. Discussing reasons for the violence in Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda, the author states:
Both conflicts resulted from the deliberate incitement of ethnic hatred and
violence by which ruthless demagogues and warlords elevated themselves to
positions of absolute power .... The calculated manipulation of fears and
tensions unleashed a self-perpetuating spiral of violence in which thousands of
citizens became the unwitting instruments of unscrupulous political elites
questing after supremacy.
Id.
286. See Kwesi Kwaa Prah, African Wars and Ethnic Conflicts - Rebuilding Failed States,
in AFRICAN REGIONAL BACKGROUND PAPER: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004 23
(2004) ("African ethnicities cannot be obliterated .... It has been consistently mobil-
ized in Africa by elites, as an instrument, to justify the pursuit of leadership interests
and access to resources, to the point of resorting to conflict in order to achieve these
ends.").
287. See, e.g., Maogoto, supra note 167, at 189 (discussing the genocide in Rwanda,
the author states that "the political instrumentalisation of ethnicity was so focused and
so pointed that Hum were led to believe-and many actually believed-that they were
doing good by killing Tutsi").
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means, simply use ethnicity as a means to advance political
objectives. 2 8 Ethnic loyalties have become more pronounced
because state failures spawned by corruption and inequitable dis-
tributions of resources create an atmosphere of uncertainty and
disorder, in which ethnic groups with a long history of mutual
distrust and hostility compete for control of the machinery of
the state.2 8 9 Political elites and ethnic groups with grudges
against the central government often stoke existing ethnic divi-
sions to mobilize support to fight for a more equitable distribu-
tion of the nation's resources.290
Criminal prosecution loses its value and chastening influ-
ence in an environment where aggressive ethnic identification
trumps everything else.29 1 One of the assumptions of criminal
law is that by stigmatizing those who commit crimes, others will
be discouraged from engaging in similar conduct. As stated ear-
lier, violence has never carried social disapproval or disgrace.
There is no sense of shame or even condemnation for those who
commit acts of violence. Rather, violence in defense of ethnic
interest is celebrated as acts of heroism by ethnic groups. Citi-
zens who commit acts of violence against other ethnic groups
are canonized as paragons of loyalty. Stigmatization loses its
sting in an environment where perpetrators of violence are im-
pervious to shame and embarrassment and when citizens en-
gulfed in the anomie and anxiety caused by ethnic tensions have
no common agreement or understanding of what constitutes un-
acceptable conduct. Adam Smith accurately stated:
[S] tigmatization has also proven difficult to realize, primarily
because of the environment within which the tribunals have
operated. Stigma requires a degree of societal concurrence
with the underlying goals and tactics of the tribunals, but soci-
eties in which tribunals have operated have usually been so
fractured that one group's stigma has been another's badge
288. See Kwaa Prah, supra note 286, at 19 (stating that "many members of the polit-
ical elite sought support from their constituencies by exploiting ethnic sentiment").
289. See Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, FOREIGN AFF., July-Au-
gust 2002, at 130 ("In the last phase of failure, the state's legitimacy crumbles. Lacking
meaningful or realistic democratic means of redress, protesters take to the streets or
mobilize along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines.").
290. See generally BILL BERKELEY, THE GRAVEs ARE NOT YET FULL: RACE, TIBE AND
POWER IN THE HEART OF AFRIcA (2001).
291. See generally Selassie, supra note 157, at 12.
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of honor.292
Moreover, in the context of mass violence, thoughtful delibera-
tive actions give way to the desire to demonstrate one's commit-
ment to the group. 293 Acclaim by their ethnic group blunts the
fears of detection and renders perpetrators of mass violence im-
mune to the pains and violence inflicted on fellow human be-
ings. Citizens who face the difficult choice of either obeying
the law or identifying with their ethnic groups increasingly
choose to join their kinsmen in perpetrating violence against
other ethnic groups. The approval of one's ethnic group is far
more important than the doubtful threats of sanctions. 215 It is
difficult to expect citizens caught in the cyclone of violence
crocheted by warlords to exercise rational judgment.296 Moreo-
ver, in some cases, participating in violence may well be the only
viable response to genocidal commands of overbearing warlords
who have both the capacity and the willingness to induce compli-
ance with their instructions. It is a well-established principle of
law that obedience to superior orders is no defense to geno-
cide.297 But in the context of mass violence and in an environ-
ment highly inhospitable to rational thinking and independent
judgment, it is unrealistic to expect citizens to resist the orders
by warlords who have repeatedly and publicly displayed their
penchant for brutality against those who dare to challenge them.
Besides the sense of duty, the celebration and aggrandizing
of violence in defense of ethnic interests renders violence an im-
292. Smith, supra note 62, at 9.
293. See Maogoto, supra note 167, at 197 ("Societies engulfed by mass violence are
not particularly conducive to rational behavior or fears of eventual apprehension. How
can we expect individuals to make a rational choice calculus when they are surrounded
by hysteria, social chaos, panic, coercion, prejudice, and a government that is exhorting
mass violence?") (footnotes omitted).
294. Writing in the Balkan context, Peter French described the mindset of perpe-
trators of mass violence that has resonance in Africa. He stated that "[t]hey know that
what they are doing to those of other ethnic groups inflicts pain and harm on them, but
they are convinced that doing so is to be preferred to acting in any other way toward
those of the hated ethnic groups." Peter A. French, Unchosen Evil and Moral Responsibil-
ity, in WAR CRIMES AND COLLECTIVE WRONG DOING: A READER 29, 42 (2001).
295. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REv. 349, 354 (1997) ("the perception that one's peers will or will not approve exerts a
much stronger influence than does that of formal sanctions").
296. See MINOW, supra note 27, at 50 ("Individuals who commit atrocities on the
scale of genocide are unlikely to behave as 'rational actors,' deterred by the risk of
punishment.").
297. See, e.g., ICTR Statute, supra note 22, art. 6(4).
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mensely rewarding enterprise. 298  In some communities, vio-
lence is considered the toga virilis of leadership and generally
accepted as a viable mode of gaining respect in the community.
Leaders earn the respect of their ethnic group by displaying the
willingness to engage in violence to defend or advance ethnic
interests. Those who engage in acts of violence derive tangible
benefits either in the form of enhanced prestige or financial re-
ward.299 Violence helps ambitious ethnic chieftains to garner
support and helps otherwise unsuccessful locals achieve upward
mobility.3"' Violence enhances the status of warlords and helps
them to achieve their objectives. Warlords garner support by
casting violence as the only meaningful way to defend the inter-
ests of their ethnic group. Citizens join them out of a sense of
ethnic solidarity or because they believe in the cause.3" ' The
masses so mobilized engage in acts of violence not so much to
inflict pain on their perceived enemies, but to demonstrate their
fealty to their ethnic group. Ethnic irredentism transforms crim-
inal conduct, even the most atrocious, into acts of courage. 0 2
Punishment loses both its deterrent and educative values in an
environment where violence is viewed as proper etiquette and
legal.30 3 Weighed against the doubtful prospects of detection
298. See Koen Vlassenroot, A Societal View on Violence and War Conflict and Militia
Formation in Eastern Congo, in VIOLENCE, POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AF-
RICA, supra note 229, at 58 (discussing violence in the context of warlord politics and
militia formation in the Kivu province of Congo, the author states that "violence is used
as a means to reorganize the local social and economic space and to control mobility
within and between spaces. Violence offers opportunities as strategies of survival for
state actors and as strategies of resistance for a new class of local or regional
strongmen.").
299. See LucaJourdan, Being at War, Being Young: Violence and Youth in North Kivu,
in CONFLICTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN EASTERN DR CONGO 162 (2004) (young
combatants use violence to their own profit, in order to renegotiate and improve their
social status).
300. Most of the warlords in Africa were relatively unknown and unaccomplished
citizens who gained notoriety by engaging in brutal displays of violence against fellow
citizens.
301. Describing the violence in Rwanda, Professor Maogoto states that "[w]hat in-
duced so many individuals to participate was not coercion, but rather genuine support
of the idea that the Tutsi has to be eliminated, together with the pursuit of solidarity
with others in attaining this goal." Maogoto, supra note 167, at 192.
302. See, e.g., Rena L. Scott, Moving From Impunity to Accountability in Post-War Libe-
ria: Possibilities, Cautions and Challenges, 33 INT'LJ. LEGAL INFO. 345, 400 (2005) ("dur-
ing times of mass violence, moral values get so inverted that individuals who are directly
responsible for war crimes are elevated in society to a status akin to national heroes").
303. As Professor Michael Reisman poignantly observes:
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and international criminal prosecution, engaging in violence,
for some citizens, seems far more attractive than self-restraint.
3 0 4
Another limitation is that criminal prosecution is an inade-
quate mechanism for promoting reconciliation.3 0 5 The enabling
statute of international tribunals operating in Africa and state-
ments by tribunal officials indicate that reconciliation is high on
the agenda of international criminal tribunals. 3 6  The simple
truth is that reconciliation has never been pursued with any real
commitment or sustained interest.3 7 The tribunals have fo-
cused inordinately on criminal prosecutions, which are poor ve-
hicles for promoting reconciliation. 3 " The driving ambitions of
a criminal trial are to apportion blame and punish the guilty.
Reestablishing social harmony is not part of the aims of a crimi-
In liberal societies, the criminal law model presupposes some moral choice or
moral freedom on the part of the putative criminal. In many of the most
hideous international crimes, many of the individuals who are directly respon-
sible operate within a cultural universe that inverts our morality and elevates
their actions to the highest form of group, tribe, or national defense. After
years or generations of acculturation to these views, the perpetrators may not
have had the moral choice that is central to our notion of criminal responsibil-
ity.
W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human
Rights, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77 (1996).
304. The possibility of punishment is often not enough to discourage citizens from
engaging in criminal conduct, especially mass violence, when citizens willingly engage
in acts of violence believing that they can evade detection and also because they believe
that the benefits of violence far outweigh the risks. See Helen Fein, Patrons, Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide: Observations on Bosnia and Rwanda, in THE PREVENTION OF
GENOCIDE: RWANDA AND YuGOStLAvtA RECONSIDERED 5 (1994) (noting that genocide is
preventable because it is usually a rational act: That is the perpetrators calculate the
likelihood of success, given their values and objectives).
305. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR's HONOR 188 (1997) (citing the desire
for revenge as an obstacle to reconciliation); MINOW, supra note 27, at 26 (noting that
'reconciliation is not the goal of criminal trials except in the most abstract sense");
Daly, supra note 48, at 106 (arguing that trials do not promote reconciliation because
they are both adversarial and divisive); Jacques Fierens, Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy
and Reality, 3J. INT'L CRiM.Jus-r. 896, 916 (2005) (noting that trials rarely enable recon-
ciliation particularly when the crimes in question are among the most serious imagina-
ble); Sarkin & Daly, supra note 141, at 691 (questioning the relationship between crimi-
nal trials and reconciliation and concluding that trials rarely promote societal reconcili-
ation).
306. The United Nations Security Council, in establishing the ICTR, stated that
the ICTR was designed to "contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to
the restoration and maintenance of peace." See ICTR Statute, supra note 22, pmbl.
307. See generally Dieng, supra note 28; INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 28, at 19.
308. See generally My NEIGHBOR, My ENEMY. JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE ArER-
MATH OF MAss ATROCITY (2004) (discussing the role of trials in post-conflict reconcilia-
tion).
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nal trial. 30 9 Reconciliation, if and when it happens after a trial, is
often an adventitious outcome. 3'0 Reconciliation demands a re-
ciprocal willingness on the part of both the perpetrators and the
victims to transcend the past. Defendants must extend the cour-
tesy of good faith to both the society and their victims, come to
terms with their crimes by confessing and tendering an apology,
and generally display the level of contrition needed to achieve
peace and reconciliation. Victims, on their part, must break free
from the clutches of their painful past, submit to the liberating
influence and power of forgiveness, and actively seek to put the
ugly past behind them and get on with their lives.
Criminal trials do not and cannot extract such a reciprocal
commitment from the parties. Rather, trials are conducted in a
setting that either completely ignores or fails to sufficiently ac-
knowledge the humanity of the parties. The law is applied ac-
cording to established rules and standards with scant or no re-
gard to the emotions of the parties. Trials scarcely induce genu-
ine contrition from criminal defendants, most of whom remain
defiant and unrepentant until the end.3 1 1 High-profile defend-
ants like Milosevic at the ICTY, Saddam Hussein at the Iraqi
High Tribunal, and Charles Taylor now standing trial before the
International Criminal Court, rather than display contrition or
remorse, used the platform of trial to spew invectives on the sys-
309. See MINOW, supra note 27, at 26 (noting that reconciliation is not the goal of
criminal trials except in the most abstract sense).
310. See Daly, supra note 48, at 105. Professor Daly advances convincing reasons
why criminal trials do not promote social stability:
Criminal trials do not foster social stability because criminal trials are designed
for stable societies that operate well, where crime is an aberration. Assuming
that the society is otherwise healthy, they seek to remove criminal anomaly.
Trials address the problem of crime only incrementally, one perpetrator at a
time. In transitional societies rife with massive violations of human rights,
however, crime is the norm. It is not sufficient to remove an isolated offender,
even a leader; rather, it is necessary to treat, and transform the society as a
whole.
Id.
311. See AMNESTY AFTER ATROCITY?, supra note 10.
[L]ike any other convicted criminal, even a convicted genocidaire can emerge
from an entire criminal proceeding while still denying the factual basis of the
court's findings, while expressing a general attitude that says that-whether he
committed the crimes in question or not-there is nothing wrong with such
actions, and indeed while still also exhibiting an attitude of strong disdain to
the court, to the political order that it represents, and to all the victims of the
act.
Id. at 213.
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tem, the tribunal, and even the victims of their atrocities.312 Tri-
als also rarely blunt the victims' desire for vengeance. Feelings
of resentment and negative emotions toward the perpetrators of
evil will not evanesce simply because of criminal prosecutions
undertaken by or under the auspices of the international com-
munity. Using trials to promote reconciliation in an environ-
ment where the parties have not transcended the passions, senti-
ments, and bitterness that led to violence is not only illusory, but
farcical. Korel Kovanda, a Czech diplomat, in his contributions
to the debate and negotiations that culminated in the establish-
ment of the ICTR, stated:
IJ]ustice is one thing; reconciliation, however, is another.
The tribunal might become a vehicle of justice, but it is
hardly designed as a vehicle of reconciliation. Justice treats
criminals whether or not they see the error of their ways; but
reconciliation is much more complicated, and it is certainly
impossible until and unless the criminals repent and show re-
morse. Only then can they even beg their victims for forgive-
ness and only then can reconciliation possibly be attained.313
Africans and scholars opposed to criminal prosecutions
have endlessly asserted that prosecutions will deepen fissures in
the society, prolong rifts and expose hapless citizens to further
hardships and the continued predations of their desperate lead-
ers. 14 Some of these claims ultimately prove exaggerated, but
the adverse effects of trials cannot be completely discounted.
Trials exert considerable strain on African societies. As stated
earlier, criminal trials tend to impede, rather than facilitate, rec-
onciliation.315 In the adversarial system, parties are locked
against each other and often engage in hostile confrontations all
in an attempt to sway the fact finder to see things their way. The
312. See id.
313. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc.S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994).
314. See McMorran, supra note 67, at 2 (arguing that war crimes tribunals could act
as a wedge driving the two groups further apart); see also Amstutz, supra note 49 (stating
that exclusive focus on prosecution can impair the quest for unity).
315. See Zolo, supra note 69.
Sometimes-as in Yugoslavia and Rwanda-the punitive justice of ad hoc in-
ternational tribunals may even have contrary effects to those hoped for. This
kind of punishment can symbolically reinforce feelings of hostility, and fuel
the wish for revenge and exclusion rather than eradicating crime. Indeed, it
does not encourage rival parties to agree upon or achieve forms of settlement
and mediation aimed at rebuilding the social texture and civil solidarity.
Id. at 734.
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guilty party is punished by the imposition of a fine, incarcera-
tion, or in extreme cases, execution. 16 As stated earlier, once
the process is set in motion, it becomes difficult, perhaps impos-
sible to reconcile the parties.3 t7 Societies sundered by years of
ethnic distrust risk further disruption by post-conflict criminal
prosecutions. 318 The arrest, detention and subsequent prosecu-
tion of ethnic leaders will inflame passions of their supporters
and diminish prospects of reconciliation. Criminal prosecutions
will neither erase ethnic tensions in deeply fractured societies,
nor push ethnic groups to transcend hatred and distrust that
characterize their relationships with each other. The adversarial
nature of trials tends to exacerbate intergroup suspicions. In
some cases, threat of prosecution provides perverse incentives
for warlords to continue in their fight.31 9 Leaders, aptly de-
scribed as "spoilers," will do whatever they can, including resort-
ing to violence to frustrate efforts to reestablish social equilib-
rium.3 '2 0 Recognition of these problems probably accounts for
the adoption of non-incarcerative options like amnesty 21 and
316. The appropriate sentence is often stated in the law establishing the crime.
317. See Fink, supra note 43, at 101.
318. See Burleigh T. Wilkins, Whose Trials? Whose Reconciliation?, in WAR CRIMES
AND COLLECrivE WRONGDOING, supra note 294, at 85, 94 ("In the final analysis, reconcili-
ation is not achieved by courts of law and adversarial proceedings but only by institu-
tional reforms and ultimately a change of heart, and prolonged legal proceedings may
be an impediment to both.").
319. See Blumenson, supra note 42, at 842-43 ("Sometimes obtaining indictments
may induce a criminal regime to cling to power, leaving that country's population con-
signed to suffer continued violations of their most fundamental rights."); see also Ku &
Nzelibe, supra note 40, at 818 ("[B]elligerents or state actors who are participating in
humanitarian atrocities are less likely to have an incentive to sue for peace if they know
they will be subject to subsequent prosecution for their activities.").
320. See Stephen J. Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, in INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR (2000) (characterizes as spoilers "leaders
and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power,
world view, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it").
321. As part of a trade-off for peace and stability, some emerging democracies
grant amnesty for human rights violators of the former regime. Countries that have
acquiesced to amnesty include Argentina, Chile, Haiti, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone.
See Roman Boed, The Effect of a Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute
Alleged Perpetrators of Serious Human Rights Violations, 33 CORNELL INr'L L.J. 297, 298
(2000); see generally Karen Gallagher, No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities of Amnesty in
Sierra Leone, 23 T.JEFFERSON L. REv. 149 (2000) (discussing the amnesty deal granted to
rebels in Sierra Leone). See generally AMNESlY AFTER ATROCITY?, supra note 10 (examin-
ing post-conflict responses by different countries and urging policy makers to rethink
their obsession with criminal prosecution).
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truth commissions to deal with the aftermath of mass violence.3 22
It is also clear that criminal trials can neither address the
underlying societal problems that lead to mass violence nor
reestablish trust across ethnic lines.323 On the other hand, feel-
ings that one ethnic group is using the criminal process to settle
old scores will continue to fuel disenchantment that may ulti-
mately lead to tit-for-tat violence. In Africa, at least in the fore-
seeable future, maintaining or reestablishing social equilibrium
will require managing ethnic interests-a task which criminal
prosecution is ill-equipped to address.3 24 Seeking reconciliation
through criminal prosecutions without managing ethnic ten-
sions will remain a sisyphean obligation unless efforts are made
to deal with the situation, system and culture that create vio-
lence. As Andrew Rigby aptly stated:
[I] t is doubtful that reconciliation in its deepest sense can be
approached without addressing the structures of inequity and
exclusion that constituted the framework within which the
everyday violence of the old order was perpetrated .... For
people to move together along the path of reconciliation it is
crucial that a sustained effort is made to transform the struc-
tures and circumstances of every day life that embody and
perpetuate the old divisions between "us" and "them" and be-
tween perpetrators, beneficiaries and victims. Only when
people feel that the evils of the past will not return, when they
believe that "things are moving in the right direction," will
they be in a position to loosen the bonds of the past, relin-
quish the impulse for revenge and orient towards the future.
In other words, reconciliation needs to be grounded in a sus-
322. Countries that have adopted this strategy include Chile, El Salvador and
South Africa. See generally HAYNER, supra note 17.
323. See Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 82, at 395 (while prosecuting and punish-
ing the worst perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda, i.e. the leaders and organizers as well
as those who committed the killings, seems to be necessary to instill a culture of ac-
countability and break the cycle of impunity, "it may be insufficient to strike on its own
at the root" the inner social and political factors which made such large scale atrocity
possible, and which can, if left unaltered, determine its recurrence).
324. See RWANDA's GENOCIDE, supra note 72, at 205.
("[T]he tribunal itself cannot reconcile the Hutus and the Tutsis because it is
not in the mainstream of Rwandan daily existence, and indeed it is doubtful
that any court can achieve this outcome .... Reconciliation cannot be im-
posed from outside. Investing the possibility of such an outcome on the legal
process-an international one, for that matter-might be asking too much
from a court of law."
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tamined effort at restitution and "putting things right.
'1 2
5
It is becoming increasingly clear that poor, illiterate, misguided
citizens embroiled in the cauldron of seething intrigues and chi-
canery engineered by scheming warlords have neither the capac-
ity nor inclination to think rationally. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that the ICTR did not discourage the masses from participat-
ing in the violence and genocide in Darfur, the Congo and
Sierra Leone. 6
It is also clear that warlords, political leaders and govern-
ment officials irredeemably committed to nihilistic violence will
not be deterred by threat of criminal prosecutions. 27 Some
scholars have expressed doubts about the deterrent values of
criminal prosecutions. 2' For example, Carlos Nino doubts the
ability of trials to deter perpetrators of mass violence, which he
described in terms popularized by Emmanuel Kant as "radical
evil." He stated that "it is not clear whether punishing radical
evil can prevent similar acts from taking place when these
favorable conditions are present nor is it clear whether punish-
ment forestalls the emergence of these conditions. "329
Another scholar, Kenneth Rodman, argues that perpetra-
tors of mass violence need much more than threat of prosecu-
tions to deter them. "Those who perpetrate mass atrocities ex-
pect to win, and are likely to be deterred only by credible pros-
325. Rigby, supra note 224.
326. See Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 65, at 20. The authors state that "evidence
from recent cases cast doubt on the claims that international trials deter future atroci-
ties, contribute to consolidating the rule of law or democracy or pave the way for
peace." Referring specifically to the ICTY and ICTR, they concluded that "neither the
Yugoslavia nor the Rwanda tribunals has had a demonstrable effect on reducing atroci-
ties globally or on altering the calculations of combatants in conflicts in East Timor,
Chechnya, Sierra Leone or other war sites." Id.
327. See Charles Villa-Vicenio, Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted:
Where the International Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L. J. 205, 210 (2000)
(stating that fixed mindsets, entrenched prejudice and the kind of ideological bloody-
mindedness that drives militant perpetrators are forces too powerful to be curtailed by
the threats of future prosecutions alone).
328. See Wilkins, supra note 318, at 87 ("I think [it is] abundantly clear that trials
for war crimes have not had any effect whatsoever on the waging of wars or the manner
in which wars have been conducted. So-called aggressive wars continue to be fought,
often with great barbarity on both sides of the conflict.").
329. NINO, supra note 211, at x; see also McMorran, supra note 67 ("[Wjar crimes
tribunals offer no deterrent to potential criminals whatsoever. People with strong con-
victions against a certain religious or ethnic group will likely not feel any less hatred for
that group just because a possible tribunal looms in the future.").
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pect of outside intervention to change that expectation, not by
the threat of post-hoc prosecution should they be proven
wrong. " 3 3
0
In some cases, foregoing criminal prosecutions may be a
sensible and pragmatic way to bring warring political elites into
the fold.33' Thabo Mbeki, the then Deputy President of South
Africa, conceded that much when he stated that "had there been
a threat of a Nuremberg-style trial over members of the
apartheid security establishment we would have never under-
gone peaceful change. "332
CONCLUSION
A stable Africa is good not only for Africans, but also for the
international community. 333 It is therefore important for the in-
ternational community to help Africa meet the challenges of
creating a context in which elected officials respect human
rights and citizens learn to process their grievances through es-
tablished legal channels. Efforts and resources needed to create
this context are enormous. But failure to address the problems
that create and perpetuate violence in Africa will lead to disas-
trous consequences that may in the end cost more. The human
tragedy that haunts Africa will be sadly repetitive unless Africans
learn the salutary lessons implicit in the activities of interna-
tional criminal tribunals. These lessons include an end to impu-
nity as well as respect for human and civil rights. One never-to-
be forgotten lesson of the international criminal tribunals is that
330. Kenneth Rodman, Compromising Justice: Why the Bush Administration and the
NGOs are Both Wrong About the ICC, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 40 (2006).
331. See MAY, supra note 261.
[T]rials themselves are most problematical when large groups participate, or
are complicit, in mass harms. The result is that in some situations, we may do
better with various alternative remedies to criminal punishment, such as those
remedies provided by truth commissions and amnesty programs. These alter-
natives to trials may better advance the goals of reconciliation than would
criminal trials, with their heightening of adversarial tensions.
Id. at 237.
332. Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in TRUTH
V. JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 43.
333. See Susan Rice, The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States, BROOK-
INGS INST. POL'y BRIEF No. 116 (2003) (arguing that failed and failing states serve as safe
havens and staging grounds for terrorist organizations and that failed states create envi-
ronments that spur interregional conflicts with significant economic and security costs
to neighboring states).
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sovereignty does not immunize abusive behavior.33 4 Citizens, re-
gardless of rank or status, have equal standing before the law
and are accountable for their actions.
Notwithstanding the problems, challenges, and even fail-
ures of international criminal tribunals, the last decade marked
the ascendancy of accountability in Africa. Criminal prosecu-
tions serve the vital purpose of focusing attention on impunity.
International criminal prosecutions have raised awareness in
both the leaders and the masses that Africa is no longer a conse-
quence-free zone where atrocities go unpunished. Africa will be
better served if the attention and momentum generated by inter-
national criminal prosecutions translate into broader and more
determined efforts to deal with the underlying social factors that
spun violence. The relative ineffectiveness of the ICTR demon-
strates the futility of trying to change the dynamics of ethnic
group relations or cultural ethos solely through criminal prose-
cutions. Criminal prosecution will have a greater impact on the
assault on impunity if it is complemented by multi-layered efforts
that simultaneously promote accountability and reestablish so-
cial harmony.3 5 Before yielding to the impulse to prosecute, ef-
forts must be made to ascertain the best strategy that fits a given
country's needs and circumstances. 6 Imposing an accountabil-
ity system, especially the Western-type justice system, on a coun-
try with different cultural and social assumptions may prove
counter productive. 7 There is no template for dealing with im-
punity.338 Every country is different and what worked in one
334. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
335. See Hafner & King, supra note 99, at 91 ("In the aftermath of civil conflict
marked by widespread human rights violations, international criminal tribunals alone
cannot bear the full burden of doing justice and stitching polities back together. They
must be augmented by other mechanisms.").
336. See Daly, supra note 48, at 78 (stating that only institutional mechanisms that
are tailored to the specific attributes of the local society at the time of transition can
hope to deal with the problems that characterized the society's dysfunction).
337. David Crane expressed similar admonition when he argued that "[t]he impo-
sition of international justice on a continent that, at the grass root level, resolves much
of its disputes using traditional methods, leads to confusion and political tensions and
may even threaten the respect for the rule of law we are attempting to nurture." Crane,
supra note 106, at 1686.
338. See W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintaining
Public Order, 6 DuKEJ. COMP. & INr'L L. 175 (1995).
There is no general institution that can be applied as a paradigm for all cir-
cumstances. In each context, an institution appropriate to the protection and
reestablishment of public order in the unique circumstances that prevail must
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country may be ineffective in another society.339 Every country
must confect a plan that suits its unique needs and circum-
stances.3 4 °
The naive expectations that Africans will wholeheartedly
welcome Western concepts of justice account for the unwilling-
ness on the part of the international community to appreciate
the meaningful roles traditional justice systems can play in the
fight against impunity. 34' Lack of sustained international sup-
port for traditional conflict resolution mechanisms is startling,
given the growing interest among Africans and scholars in the
idea of using traditional African dispute resolution mechanisms
to address the aftermath of mass violence. 42 Failure to support
traditional modes of conflict resolution is regrettable because it
is becoming increasingly obvious that the traditional justice sys-
tem will be "an important technique for stitching together the
wounds in civil society that precipitate and often result in con-
flict. 3143 It is also abundantly clear that the ambitions of the in-
ternational community for justice and social equilibrium in Af-
rica can never fully be attained by focusing exclusively on crimi-
nal prosecutions. 44 A better and more effective strategy to
be fashioned such that it provides the greatest return on all the relevant goals
of public order.
Id. at 185.
339. See PhilipJ. Drew, Dealing with Mass Atrocities and Ethnic Violence: Can Alterna-
tive Forms of Justice be Effective? A Case Study of Rwanda, CAN. F. ON CIv. JusT., 2002, http:/
/cfcj-fcjc.org/clearinghouse/drpapers/rwanda.htm (stating that "it must be kept in
mind that not all societies are the same. International (and national) responses to is-
sues such as those in Rwanda need to be sensitive to both the differences and common-
alities between various societies and their concepts of law.").
340. See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 262, at 633-34 (urging NGOs, humanita-
rian relief agencies, diplomats, and scholars to devote more attention and thought to-
ward enabling local communities to develop and implement responses that represent
their aspirations for social repair).
341. See id. at 611-12 n.137 (noting that to date, relatively little attention has been
paid to the cultural contexts in which criminal accountability for mass violence is con-
templated).
342. See Alvarez, supra note 77, at 370 (stating international processes for criminal
accountability need to encourage and adapt to local processes directed toward the same
end); see also Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Post Conflict Transitions: A Social
Scientist's Perspective on the African Case, 95 AM. J. Irr'L L. 64, 65 (advocating the rebuild-
ing of local justice mechanisms in post-conflict societies and contending that "the cul-
tural milieu of most African societies strengthens the legitimacy of local forums").
343. Reisman, supra note 303, at 79.
344. See Goldstein-Bolocan, supra note 82, at 394-95 (stating that in the aftermath
of the genocide, the exclusive recourse to criminal trials, adjudication and imprison-
ment have failed to promote justice and societal reconciliation).
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promote accountability in Africa and facilitate healing and rec-
onciliation in African countries sundered by mass violence
should combine criminal prosecutions with traditional justice
methods of conflict resolution.345 The dominant aims of post-
conflict societies are the reestablishment of social equilibrium
and reconciliation. In appropriate cases, therefore, it makes a
lot of sense to "defer the right to retribution to the extent that
retribution would obstruct peace. '346 It is time to pay greater
attention to the wise and salutary admonition from the editors of
the Harvard Law Review:
[I]nternational prosecution is just one element in a toolbox
of accountability. In any given context, those who seek ac-
countability must closely examine their objectives to ensure
that the mix of tools they select is best tailored to the particu-
lar need. Exaggerating what just one tool-international
prosecution-can reasonably accomplish may distract atten-
tion and resources from other more suitable mechanisms and
will inevitably lead to disappointment in the prosecutions'
performance. Instead, those seeking accountability should
carefully examine what they seek to accomplish, employ well-
designed prosecutions to satisfy the highest priority goals,
and supplement tribunals with other mechanisms to address
the objectives for which prosecution all too often falls
short.3
47
345. Although criminal prosecution is necessary to address impunity, it seems, as
demonstrated by the relative success of the Gacaca courts in Rwanda, that traditional
methods of conflict resolution tend to have greater impact on the quest for social equi-
librium and reconciliation.
346. Bert Van Roermund, Rubbing Off and Rubbing On: The Grammar of Reconcilia-
tion, in LETHE'S LAW: JUSTICE, LAW AND ETHICS IN RECONCILIATION 180 (2001).
347. The Promise of International Prosecution, supra note 64, at 1982.
